Governor McAuliffe Appoints 27-Member Parole Commission

Bipartisan Participants Represent Law Enforcement, Community Groups, Academia 

RICHMOND – Today Governor Terry McAuliffe announced the appointment of an experienced group of law enforcement professionals, legislators, community leaders and academics to serve on his Commission on Parole Review. On June 24^ththe Governor signed Executive Order No. 44 creating the Commission and charging it with reviewing Virginia’s approach to parole and recommending any policy changes that may enhance public safety while protecting taxpayer dollars. The Commission will be chaired by former Virginia Attorney General Mark Earley, Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security Brian Moran and Secretary of the Commonwealth Levar Stoney.

“This bipartisan panel of Virginia leaders will bring an array of perspectives to this important discussion about how our Commonwealth can best keep our communities safe while spending every taxpayer dollar as wisely as possible,” said Governor McAuliffe.  “I applaud their willingness to put political dogma and preconceived notions aside and engage in a thoughtful process about how this policy has worked for Virginians over the past twenty years and whether there are any opportunities to improve it going forward. With the guidance of Co-Chairs Moran, Stoney and Earley, I am confident that their final report will represent the best interests of all citizens of the Commonwealth.”

The first meeting of the Commission is scheduled for Monday, July 20, from 1-4 p.m. in House Room 3, Virginia State Capitol. 

The Commission will address five significant priorities related to Parole Reform:

1.      Conduct A Review of Previous Goals and Subsequent Outcomes.

2.      Examine the Cost of Parole Reform/Abolition

3.      Evaluate the Best Practices of Other States

4.      Recommend Other Mediation Strategies

5.      Provide Recommendations to Address Public Safety Challenges

A draft report is due to the Governor by Nov. 2, 2015, with a final report due Dec. 4, 2015.

Members are as follows:

·         The Honorable Mark L. Earley, Sr., of Leesburg, Former Attorney General of Virginia; Owner, Earley Legal Group, LLC.  Will serve as Chair.

·         The Honorable Brian Moran of Arlington, Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security.  Will serve as Co-Chair.

·         The Honorable Levar M. Stoney of Richmond, Secretary of the Commonwealth.  Will serve as Co-Chair.

·         The Honorable Jill Vogel of Fauquier, Member, Senate of Virginia

·         The Honorable Dave Marsden of Burke, Member, Senate of Virginia

·         The Honorable Dave Albo of Fairfax, Member, Virginia House of Delegates; Chairman, Courts of Justice Committee

·         The Honorable Luke E. Torian of Prince William, Member, Virginia House of Delegates

·         The Honorable Kenneth W. Stolle of Virginia Beach, Sheriff, Virginia Beach Sheriff’s Office

·         The Honorable La Bravia J. Jenkins of the City of Fredericksburg,  Commonwealth’s Attorney

·         Gail Arnall, Ph.D., of Washington, DC, Consultant for Outreach and Development, Offender Aid and Restoration

·         Camille Cooper of Louisa, Director of Government Affairs, The National Association to PROTECT Children & PROTECT. 

·         Marcus M. Hodges of Spotsylvania, President, National Association of Probation Executives

·         Cynthia E. Hudson of Richmond, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General

·         Kimberly Lettner of Farmville, Retired Chief of Police, Division of Capitol Police

·         William R. Richardson, Jr. of Arlington, Member, Virginia CURE; Retired partner, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP.

·         Cheryl Robinette of Buchanan, Director of Substance Abuse Services, Cumberland Mountain Community Services Board

·         Mira Signer of Richmond, Executive Director, National Alliance on Mental Illness of Virginia

·         Faye S. Taxman, Ph.D.,  of Gaithersburg, MD, Professor, George Mason University

·         David R. Lett of Richmond, Public Defender, Petersburg Public Defender’s Office

·         Meredith Farrar-Owens of Henrico, Director, Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission

·         Sandra M. Brandt of Norfolk, Executive Director, STEP-UP inc.

·         Alvin Edwards, Ph.D, of Charlottesville, Pastor, Mt. Zion First African Baptist Church

·         Jack Gravely, JD. of Richmond, Executive Director, Virginia State NAACP

·         Bobby N. Vassar of Richmond, Chief Counsel (Retired), U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime

·         Timothy J. Heaphy of Charlottesville, Partner, Hunton & Williams, former United States Attorney for the Western District of Virginia

·         Mindy M. Stell of Dinwiddie, President, Virginia Victim Assistance Network

·         Thomas M. Wolf of Richmond, Partner, LeClairRyan

Ex-Officio Members:

·         Tonya Chapman of Richmond, Deputy Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security

·         Karen Brown of Richmond, Chair, Virginia Parole Board

·         Harold Clarke of Richmond, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections

·         Francine Ecker of Richmond, Director, Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services

·         Margaret Schultze of Richmond, Commissioner, Virginia Department of Social Services

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Gloucester, Virginia Civil War, Andrew Jackson Andrews Autobiography

Civil War Account - Gloucester, Virginia Andrew J Andrews

An autobiography from a Gloucester citizen from the time of the American Civil War.  A first hand account of what the war was like in this area.  A very rare book.  We have had a copy of this for several years but it had a lot of issues and we spent numerous hours trying to clean it all up only to get about three quarters of the way through it.  We found this copy so now we do not have worry about finishing up that last quarter.  Slideshare members can download a free copy of this book any time.  Its a really great read with some very interesting information in it.

Perfect for the Civil War historian and local re enactors and anyone else with an interest in local history.  

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The Original 13th Amendment To The Bill of Rights: 1840

A study of history can turn up some very big surprises.  Not in favor of present conditions is one we just recently came across.  We just found in a book written and published back in 1840 and known as the "American Citizens Manual", and comes from the Library of Congress, so it is an official document of the United States, some very disturbing evidence that history has in fact been tampered with and against the people no less.

  The book has a number of facts that are not in the least common knowledge today.  In fact, the Bill of Rights is not even called the Bill of Rights but instead, Amendments to the Constitution.  The first 12 amendments are the same as we read them today, however, in 1840, there was in fact a 13th amendment.  It is not the same as we have today.  What is that amendment?

1840: XIII- If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall without the consent of Congress, accept or retain any present, pension, office, or emolument of any kind whatever from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them or either of them.

Today we are told that the 13th Amendment that we all commonly know reads as follows and came about in 1865.

1865 XIII - Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

                  Section 2.  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Interesting.  These two amendments that both claim to be the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution, also know as the Bill of Rights, are not even close.  So it would seem that we have two 13th Amendments to the Bill of rights.  What happened to the original on listed in a book published in 1840?

American Citizens Manual- 1840, Real Law from Chuck Thompson

Take a look at page 28 of the book ported in here to see the original 13th Amendment as stated in this article above.  On the way to that page, note that the book is an official Library of Congress documented book.  Our so called present 13th Amendment to the Bill of rights was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the Thirty-eighth Congress, on the 31st day of January, 1865 and was declared, in a proclamation of the Secretary of State, dated the 18th of December, 1865, to have been ratified by the legislatures of twenty-seven of the thirty-six States.

  Abraham Lincoln was still the President of the United Stated when this began in January 31st, 1865.  He was not assassinated until April 15th, 1865.  (Anyone notice anything peculiar about that date?)  The official end of the Civil War was April 9th, 1865.  11 of the 36 states of the Union were not a part of the Union at that time.  There were 11 Confederate states leaving only 25 states left in the Union when this new 13th amendment was started.

  Now this is where it continues to get even more interesting.  Virginia, on February, 9th, 1865, a Confederate State, somehow managed to ratify this new 13th Amendment with the Union?  That is what our United States government tells us today.  And no one questions this?  Really?  Yes really.

(Citation: - The Constitution of the United States of America - 108th Congress, 1st session, Document number 108-95.  United States Government Printing Office Washington: 2003. ISBN 0-16-05-1424-X)

  What would be the purpose of getting rid of the original 13th Amendment and replacing it with a new one?  Well, you have to know and understand your history.  Both the Confederate States and the Union States received financing for their war efforts from foreign countries.  A violation of the original 13th Amendment and a very serious problem for all politicians and government employees at so many levels.  Everyone involved was now guilty of crimes against the United States.  If the original 13th Amendment were made to disappear, then, no harm, no foul.  Everyone walks away without issues.  With the original 13th Amendment still in place, even Lincoln was a criminal guilty of treason against his own country who would have lost his citizenship and would have needed to be hung for treason against the country.

  It is not at all in the interest of any politician anywhere for the original 13th amendment to ever come back as they are all guilty of treason for accepting any foreign present, money, office, title and so forth.  Contributions to campaigns from foreign nations to say the likes of the Clinton's from China?  Even our Virginia governor Terry McAuliffe would need to be hung for treason with all the work he does with China.  This marked the beginning of the end of the United States that so many try and fight for.  It is the full justification of treason against ones own country.

  You will never see this in any past history book or present ones for that matter.  Few have ever put it together.  Even fewer understand it.  This article will not be popular either even though it exposes the information.  Not enough people will ever see this to make any difference and many will be thankful for that.  History you were never meant to know.    

This is not what any of them ever fought for.

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The Story of a Common Soldier of Army Life in the Civil War, 1861-1865

George B. McClellan and Ellen Mary Marcy McClellan (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Audio book.  The Story of a Common Soldier of Army Life in the Civil War.  You do not have to read a book to enjoy one.  Here you can listen to the entire book.

Army Life In The Civil War from Chuck Thompson

Or read the book above.  To read it full screen, left click the icon at the far right hand bottom side of the above container.  To exit full screen, just hit the escape key on your keyboard.

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Federalist Papers No. 30. Concerning the General Power of Taxation

From the New York Packet. Friday, December 28, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.

Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time, perish.

In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public might require?

The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as has already been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their judgment, to the service of the United States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement of the articles of Union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed, yet in practice it has been constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.

What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the public treasury.

The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This distinction, however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that, IN THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.

To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices and deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated in the course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between the federal head and its members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in the economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution, can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be any thing else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?

Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.

It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the case supposed would exist, though the national government should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by loans.

The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.

Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon it.

PUBLIUS

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Federalist Papers No. 27.The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (2)

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 25, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and maxims.

Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to induce a probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular governments; the principal of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that through the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members.

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single member.

I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those channels and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulsion.

One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.(1) Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a conduct?

PUBLIUS

1. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its proper place, be fully detected.

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