Undermining The Constitution A HISTORY OF LAWLESS GOVERNMENT (Part 6)

Chief Justice John Marshall established a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

By Thomas James Norton

THE LONG-PURSUED PURPOSE OF CONGRESS TO CROSS THE BARRIER OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND ENTER THE POLICE FIELD OF THE STATES, OFTEN CHECKED BY THE COURTS AND THE PEOPLE, WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT OF 1921

in enacting the Packers and Stockyards Act of August 15, 1921, Congress did not move in obedience to powerful voting groups, as it did when it passed An Act for the Promotion of the Welfare and Hygiene of Maternity and Infancy, and for Other Purposes, and as it did in passing the bills on Child Labor.

It had no apparent reason for disregarding the Tenth Amendment and meddling in the duties of the States. There may have been complaints about the charges or services to the public of the stockyards at Chicago. If there had been dissatisfaction in that respect, the complaints should have been lodged with the commission of Illinois having authority. No default in the service of a corporation of a State could have given jurisdiction to Congress.

A belief of many dangerous to constitutionalism

While the opinion has often been expressed by persons otherwise well educated that if a State will not perform

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its duty, then let the Nation do it, the Constitution is not changeable that way: An amendment is necessary to a change. The idea, however, is startlingly prevalent. Multitudes believe that the National Government should take over more often than it has done.
Whatever the urge, Congress stepped into Illinois and took the control of the stockyards at Chicago away from the State. The sanction in 1922 by the Supreme Court (258 U. S. 495) of the action of Congress made the law effective as to stockyards on railroads in other States, and managing bureaus moved in.
The action by Congress was under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which empowers it "to regulate commerce among the several States." This clause and the General Welfare Clause are the two stand-bys for Congress when it finds the Tenth Amendment in its way of stripping the States and The People of their freedoms.
Governor Roosevelt condemned congressional invasion of States
The Packers and Stockyards case was undoubtedly in the mind of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York when, in 1929, addressing a meeting of governors, he condemned unsparingly the "stretching" of the Commerce Clause by Congress to cover its intrusions into the States.
The stockyards at Chicago were being regulated by the State of Illinois. Livestock coming from other States was unloaded at the yards, fed and sheltered. Dealers in livestock had offices in or near the yards and made purchases there. Most of the animals received at the stockyards were taken by the large packing companies and manufactured into beef, pork, and other meats and foods. Those manufactured products were in part shipped out of Illinois to other States.

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Someone in Congress or elsewhere conceived the idea that the transportation of freight was continuous, from the feeding lots where the livestock was fattened to the States in which the meats were consumed, and that therefore Illinois should have no control of such "interstate" commerce.
Stockyards Act superfluous as well as illegal
In the statement of facts preceding the opinion by Chief Justice Taft, it was said that "the act seeks to regulate the business of packers done in interstate commerce." But that could have been done without usurping the police power of the State of Illinois over a local industry. For the Sherman Anti-Trust Law had been enacted in 1891, thirty years before, to prevent or remove the conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade and competition which were in this case charged against the packers.^[1] The Chief Justice said that the Packers and Stockyards Act "forbids unfair, discriminatory and deceptive practices in such commerce" -- precisely what the Sherman Law had long forbidden. Except that the Sherman Law was not an invasion of the State in disregard of the Tenth Amendment. The Packers and Stockyards Act was.
The Act made the Secretary of Agriculture a tribunal to
1. The Sherman Law was supplemented in 1914 by the Clayton Act. In the same year the Federal Trade Commission Law was enacted to prevent "unfair methods in competition in interstate commerce."
In suits under the Sherman Law combinations like Standard Oil and Northern Securities were broken apart. But each of the leading parties charges the other with failure during its time in office to enforce the anti-trust laws. Senator Borah said in a speech to his colleagues that each party is enthusiastic for regulation of too-big business only in campaign time. It is a question whether the magnitude of many industrial and commercial organizations may affect people toward a belief in Socialism or Communism.

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hear complaints of unfair and monopolistic practices and to make desist orders. That was unnecessary, for courts of equity had been giving such remedies under the Sherman Law.
Sherman Law had proved its complete adequacy
Indeed, as far back as 1905 a decree in a suit under the Sherman Law ordered (196 U.S. 875) the packers to desist from monopolistic practices in their trade in interstate commerce. And following the report of the Federal Trade Commission, and before the passage of the Packers and Stockyards Act, a bill was filed in a Federal Court of the District of Columbia to enjoin the Big Five packers from monopolistic practices in the purchase of livestock and the sale and distribution of meats. To a decree stopping the monopolistic practices complained of, the packers consented.
In 1912 these same packers had been indicted for monopolistic practices in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law and upon trial were acquitted.
The Sherman Law also proved adequate to break up Standard Oil, Northern Securities, and many other powerful monopolies.
As has been shown, the courts had many times, under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, made such combinations give up their controlling shares of stock and desist from the other practices complained of. There was no need for further legislation. The Interstate Commerce Commission had been, under the Commerce Clause, regulating transportation of commerce for more than a third of a century, and the Federal Trade Commission, under the Act of 1914, under the same clause, had for several years been

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making orders respecting fair practices in trade and commerce.
Long line of holdings submerged by Stockyards decisions
The decision in the Stockyards case was contrary to a long line of holdings by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the courts that interstate commerce begins upon the delivery of a shipment to a carrier consigned (addressed) to a point in another State, and that it ends upon delivery to the consignee. It was held, for illustration, in another case, that a shipment of property so delivered became taxable by the State where it was received. By many similar decisions the difference between interstate commerce and intrastate commerce had been clearly defined. By the definition so worked out the stockyards company in Chicago, chartered to provide for profit yardage, feed, and care for livestock, was no more engaged in interstate commerce subject to Congressional regulation than was a grocer in a nearby street receiving goods from another State. That the animals were later to go to other States in the form of foods did not make a through interstate shipment of the animals part of the way and the foods at another time the remainder of the distance.
Theory of decision of Supreme Court
The Supreme Court said that the Act treated all stockyards "as great national public utilities." But to call companies operating local yards for feeding and otherwise caring for livestock consigned to them and for facilitating local transactions between sellers and buyers, "great national public utilities," could not change the facts or con-

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fer jurisdiction on Congress to regulate their business to the ousting of the constitutional jurisdiction of the States.
However, the Supreme Court held (258 U. S. 495) otherwise, Justice McReynolds dissenting and Justice Day not sitting.
This decision is to be used later to support the extravagancies of the National Labor Relations Act as being, not what its title calls it, but a law regulating commerce among the States in accordance with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution!
Fond hope of Madison dashed
Madison fondly believed that the States would rise unanimously against any aggression by the National Government upon their local authority (The Federalist, No. 46):

"But ambitious encroachments of the Federal Government on the authority of the State governments would not excite the opposition of a single State or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole."

Those revolutionary worthies could not conceive of the pusillanimity of a century and a half thereafter! The representatives of the people of the States in Government have originated most of the invasions of the States.

[And Much Worse Two Centuries Thereafter in the 21st Century !!]

Thanks to the fine folks over at Barefoot's World.
http://www.barefootsworld.net/

Related articles

• Undermining The Constitution A HISTORY OF LAWLESS GOVERNMENT Part V
• Undermining The Constitution A HISTORY OF LAWLESS GOVERNMENT (Part 3)
• Undermining The Constitution A HISTORY OF LAWLESS GOVERNMENT (Part 1)
• Anti Federalist Papers No. 36 - Representation And Internal Taxation
• Federalist Papers No. 32. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
• Anti Federalist Papers No. 21 Why The Articles Failed

Anti Federalist Papers No's 41-43 A, Powers of The Constitution

Taken from "THE FEDERAL FARMER"

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. . . . A federal republic in itself supposes state or local governments to exist, as the body or props, on which the federal bead rests, and that it cannot remain a moment after they cease. In erecting the federal government, and always in its councils, each state must be known as a sovereign body. But in erecting this government, I conceive, the legislature of the state, by the expressed or implied assent of the people, or the people of the state, under the direction of the government of it, may accede to the federal compact. Nor do I conceive it to be necessarily a part of a confederacy of states, that each have an equal voice in the general councils. A confederated republic being organized, each state must retain powers for managing its internal police, and all delegate to the union power to manage general concerns. The quantity of power the union must possess is one thing; the mode of exercising the powers given is quite a different consideration - and it is the mode of exercising them, that makes one of the essential distinctions between one entire or consolidated government, and a federal republic. That is, however the government may be organized, if the laws of the union, in most important concerns, as in levying and collecting taxes, raising troops, etc. , operate immediately upon the persons and property of individuals, and not on states, extend to organizing the militia, etc. , the government, as to its administration, as to making and executing laws, is not federal, but consolidated. To illustrate my idea: the union makes a requisition, and assigns to each state its quota of men or monies wanted; each state, by its own laws and officers, in its own way, furnishes its quota. Here the state governments stand between the union and individuals; the laws of the union operate only on states, as such, and federally. Here nothing can be done without the meetings of the state legislatures. But in the other case the union, though the state legislatures should not meet for years together, proceeds immediately by its own laws and officers to levy and collect monies of individuals, to enlist men, form armies, etc. Here the laws of the union operate immediately on the body of the people, on persons and property. In the same manner the laws of one entire consolidated government operate. These two modes are very distinct, and in their operation and consequences have directly opposite tendencies. . . . I am not for depending wholly on requisitions.

Since the peace, and till the convention reported, the wisest men in the United States generally supposed that certain limited funds would answer the purposes of the union. And though the states are by no means in so good a condition as I wish they were, yet, I think, I may very safely affirm, they are in a better condition than they would be had congress always possessed the powers of taxation now contended for. The fact is admitted, that our federal government does not possess sufficient powers to give life and vigor to the political system; and that we experience disappointments, and several inconveniences. But we ought carefully to distinguish those which are merely the consequences of a severe and tedious war, from those which arise from defects in the federal system. There has been an entire revolution in the United States within thirteen years, and the least we can compute the waste of labor and property at, during that period, by the war, is three hundred millions of dollars. Our people are like a man just recovering from a severe fit of sickness. It was the war that disturbed the course of commerce introduced floods of paper money, the stagnation of credit, and threw many valuable men out of steady business. From these sources our greatest evils arise. Men of knowledge and reflection must perceive it. But then, have we not done more in three or four years past, in repairing the injuries of the war, by repairing houses and estates, restoring industry, frugality, the fisheries, manufactures, etc. , and thereby laying the foundation of good government, and of individual and political happiness, than any people ever did in a like time? We must judge from a view of the country and facts, and not from foreign newspapers, or our own, which are printed chiefly in the commercial towns, where imprudent living, imprudent importations, and many unexpected disappointments, have produced a despondency, and a disposition to view everything on the dark side. Some of the evils we feel, all will agree, ought to be imputed to the defective administration of the governments.

From these and various considerations, I am very clearly of opinion that the evils we sustain merely on account of the defects of the confederation, ar but as a feather in the balance against a mountain, compared with those which would infallibly be the result of the loss of general liberty, and that happiness men enjoy under a frugal, free, and mild government.

Heretofore we do not seem to have seen danger any where, but in giving power to congress, and now no where but in congress wanting powers; and without examining the extent of the evils to be remedied, by one step we ar for giving up to congress almost all powers of any importance without limitation. The defects of the confederation are extravagantly magnified, an every species of pain we feel imputed to them; and hence it is inferred, the must be a total change of the principles, as well as forms of government And in the main point, touching the federal powers, we rest all on a logical inference, totally inconsistent with experience and sound political reasoning.

It is said, that as the federal head must make peace and war, and provide for the common defense, it ought to possess all powers necessary to that end. That powers unlimited, as to the purse and sword, to raise men and monies and form the militia, are necessary to that end; and therefore, the federal head ought to possess them. This reasoning is far more specious than solid. It is necessary that these powers so exist in the body politic, as to be called into exercise whenever necessary for the public safety. But it is by no means true that the man, or congress of men, whose duty it more immediately is to provide for the common defense, ought to possess them without limitation. But clear it is, that if such men, or congress, be not in a situation to hold them without danger to liberty, he or they ought not to possess them. It has long been thought to be a well founded position, that the purse and sword ought not to be placed in the same hands in a free government. Our wise ancestors have carefully separated them - placed the sword in the hands of their king, even under considerable limitations, and the purse in the hands of the commons alone. Yet the king makes peace and war, and it is his duty to provide for the common defense of the nation. This authority at least goeth thus far - that a nation, well versed in the science of government, does not conceive it to be necessary or expedient for the man entrusted with the common defense and general tranquility, to possess unlimitedly the power in question, or even in any considerable degree. Could he, whose duty it is t defend the public, possess in himself independently, all the means of doing it consistent with the public good, it might be convenient. But the people o England know that their liberties and happiness would be in infinitely great danger from the king's unlimited possession of these powers, than from al external enemies and internal commotions to which they might be exposed Therefore, though they have made it his duty to guard the empire, yet the have wisely placed in other hands, the hands of their representatives, the power to deal out and control the means. In Holland their high mightiness must provide for the common defense, but for the means they depend in considerable degree upon requisitions made on the state or local assemblies Reason and facts evince, that however convenient it might be for an executive magistrate, or federal head, more immediately charged with the national defense and safety, solely, directly, and independently to possess all the means, yet such magistrate or head never ought to possess them if thereby the public liberties shall be endangered. The powers in question never have been, by nations wise and free, deposited, nor can they ever be, with safety, any where out of the principal members of the national system. Where these form one entire government, as in Great Britain, they are separated and lodged in the principal members of it. But in a federal republic, there is quite a different organization; the people form this kind of government, generally, because their territories are too extensive to admit of their assembling in one legislature, or of executing the laws on free principles under one entire government. They Convene in their local assemblies, for local purposes, and for managing their internal concerns, and unite their states under a federal head for general purposes. It is the essential characteristic of a confederated republic, that this head be dependent on, and kept within limited bounds by the local governments; and it is because, in these alone, in fact, the people can be substantially assembled or represented. It is, therefore, we very universally see, in this kind of government, the congressional powers placed in a few hands, and accordingly limited, and specifically enumerated; and the local assemblies strong and well guarded, and composed of numerous members. Wise men will always place the controlling power where the people are substantially collected by their representatives. By the proposed system the federal head will possess, without limitation, almost every species of power that can, in its exercise, tend to change the government, or to endanger liberty; while in it, I think it has been fully shown, the people will have but the shadow of representation, and but the shadow of security for their rights and liberties. In a confederated republic, the division of representation, etc. , in its nature, requires a correspondent division and deposit of powers, relative to taxes and military concerns. And I think the plan offered stands quite alone, in confounding the principles of governments in themselves totally distinct. I wish not to exculpate the states for their improper neglects in not paying their quotas of requisitions. But, in applying the remedy, we must be governed by reason and facts. It will not be denied that the people have a right to change the government when the majority choose it, if not restrained by some existing compact; that they have a right to displace their rulers, and consequently to determine when their measures are reasonable or not; and that they have a right, at any time, to put a stop to those measures they may deem prejudicial to them, by such forms and negatives as they may see fit to provide. From all these, and many other well founded considerations, I need not mention, a question arises, what powers shall there be delegated to the federal head, to insure safety, as well as energy, in the government? I think there is a safe and proper medium pointed out by experience, by reason, and facts. When we have organized the government, we ought to give power to the union, so far only as experience and present circumstances shall direct, with a reasonable regard to time to come.

Should future circumstances, contrary to our expectations, require that further powers be transferred to the union, we can do it far more easily, than get back those we may now imprudently give. The system proposed is untried. Candid advocates and opposers admit, that it is in a degree, a mere experiment, and that its organization is weak and imperfect. Surely then, the safe ground is cautiously to vest power in it, and when we are sure we have given enough for ordinary exigencies, to be extremely careful how we delegate powers, which, in common cases, must necessarily be useless or abused, and of very uncertain effect in uncommon ones. By giving the union power to regulate commerce, and to levy and collect taxes by imposts, we give it an extensive authority, and permanent productive funds, I believe quite as adequate to present demands of the union, as excises and direct taxes can be made to the present demands of the separate states. The state governments are now about four times as expensive as that of the union; and their several state debts added together, are nearly as large as that of the union. Our impost duties since the peace have been almost as productive as the other sources of taxation, and when under one general system of regulations, the probability is that those duties will be very considerably increased. Indeed the representation proposed will hardly justify giving to congress unlimited powers to raise taxes by imposts, in addition to the other powers the union must necessarily have. It is said, that if congress possess only authority to raise taxes by imposts, trade probably will be overburdened with taxes, and the taxes of the union be found inadequate to any uncommon exigencies. To this we may observe, that trade generally finds its own level, and will naturally and necessarily heave off any undue burdens laid upon it. Further, if congress alone possess the impost, and also unlimited power to raise monies by excises and direct taxes, there must be much more danger that two taxing powers, the union and states, will carry excises and direct taxes to an unreasonable extent, especially as these have not the natural boundaries taxes on trade have. However, it is not my object to propose to exclude congress from raising monies by internal taxes, except in strict conformity to the federal plan; that is, by the agency of the state governments in all cases, except where a state shall neglect, for an unreasonable time, to pay its quota of a requisition; and never where so many of the state legislatures as represent a majority of the people, shall formally determine an excise law or requisition is improper, in their next session after the same be laid before them. We ought always to recollect that the evil to be guarded against is found by our own experience, and the experience of others, to be mere neglect in the states to pay their quotas; and power in the union to levy and collect the neglecting states' quotas with interest, is fully adequate to the evil. By this federal plan, with this exception mentioned, we secure the means of collecting the taxes by the usual process of law, and avoid the evil of attempting to compel or coerce a state; and we avoid also a circumstance, which never yet could be, and I am fully confident never can be, admitted in a free federal republic - I mean a permanent and continued system of tax laws of the union, executed in the bowels of the states by many thousand officers, dependent as to the assessing and collecting federal taxes solely upon the union. On every principle, then, we ought to provide that the union render an exact account of all monies raised by imposts and other taxes whenever monies shall be wanted for the purposes of the union beyond the proceeds of the impost duties; requisitions shall be made on the states for the monies so wanted; and that the power of laying and collecting shall never be exercised, except in cases where a state shall neglect, a given time, to pay its quota. This mode seems to be strongly pointed out by the reason of the case, and spirit of the government; and I believe, there is no instance to be found in a federal republic, where the congressional powers ever extended generally to collecting monies by direct taxes or excises. Creating all these restrictions, still the powers of the union in matters of taxation will be too unlimited; further checks, in my mind, are indispensably necessary. Nor do I conceive, that as full a representation as is practicable in the federal government, will afford sufficient security. The strength of the government, and the confidence of the people, must be collected principally in the local assemblies. . . . A government possessed of more power than its constituent parts will justify, will not only probably abuse it, but be unequal to bear its own burden; it may as soon be destroyed by the pressure of power, as languish and perish for want of it.

There are two ways further of raising checks, and guarding against undue combinations and influence in a federal system. The first is - in levying taxes, raising and keeping up armies, in building navies, in forming plans for the militia, and in appropriating monies for the support of the military - to require the attendance of a large proportion of the federal representatives, as two-thirds or three-fourths of them; and in passing laws, in these important cases, to require the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the members present. The second is, by requiring that certain important laws of the federal head - as a requisition or a law for raising monies by excise - shall be laid before the state legislatures, and if disapproved of by a given number of them, say by as many of them as represent a majority of the people, the law shall have no effect. Whether it would be advisable to adopt both, or either of these checks, I will not undertake to determine. We have seen them both exist in confederated republics. The first exists substantially in the confederation, and will exist in some measure in the plan proposed, as in choosing a president by the house, or in expelling members; in the senate, in making treaties, and in deciding on impeachments; and in the whole, in altering the constitution. The last exists in the United Netherlands, but in a much greater extent. The first is founded on this principle, that these important measures may, sometimes, be adopted by a bare quorum of members, perhaps from a few states, and that a bare majority of the federal representatives may frequently be of the aristocracy, or some particular interests, connections, or parties in the community, and governed by motives, views, and inclinations not compatible with the general interest. The last is founded on this principle, that the people will be substantially represented, only in their state or local assemblies; that their principal security must be found in them; and that, therefore, they ought to have ultimately a constitutional control over such interesting measures.

THE FEDERAL FARMER

Learn More About United States History:  Visit Jamestown, Yorktown and Colonial Williamsburg Living Museums in Virginia.

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• Anti Federalist Papers No. 21 Why The Articles Failed
• Federalist Papers No. 41. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
• Anti Federalist Paper No. 16 - EUROPEANS ADMIRE AND FEDERALISTS DECRY THE PRESENT SYSTEM
• The Federalist Papers No 14, Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answer
• Anti federalist Papers No. 22 Articles of Confederation Simply Requires Amendments, Particularly For Commercial Power and Judicial Power; Constitution Goes Too Far
• The Anti Federalist Papers No. 17 Federalist Power Will Ultimately Subvert State Authority

157 Peer Reviews Fail to Catch Fake Cancer Study

English: Open Access  (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

By Dr. Mercola

The Internet has benefited you with vast access to information that was formerly difficult to come by. However, open access has also generated reduced quality control, sometimes turning the Information Age into the “Age of Misinformation”—especially when it comes to scientific research.

Fraud, propaganda, and misrepresentations are now commonplace, especially online, and some myths are repeated so often they eventually become accepted as fact.

Although the featured study and subsequent exposé seeks to discredit open access journals, it too has some very serious conflicting interests. Remember, traditional journals like Science are not immune to publishing flawed studies, and Open Access journals are a direct competition for them, which makes me question the motives of this Science “exposé.”

The featured “sting operation” was concocted by a Science editor who wanted to test how likely it would be for bad research to be published. But before we dig in, it is important to understand what is meant by the term “open access.”

21st Century Gives Birth to ‘Open Access Journals’

As the cost of accessing academic journal articles increases, a growing number of academic institutions are building publicly accessible databases of scholarly work. According to the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ),1 Open Access (OA) journals are defined as journals that use a funding model that does not charge readers or their institutions for access.2

There are no subscription fees to the readers. There are now some 8,250 open access scientific journals in operation worldwide.3 This is a phenomenally positive movement.

One of the major challenges with traditional journals is that they get all their content for free, most of their peer review editors are not paid as it is an honor to have that role. They typically charge hundreds of dollars a year for a subscription to 12 or fewer issues of their journal, and to top it all off, they charge you $20-$50 or more for just ONE full article.

This has always seemed to be extraordinarily unfair and like a racket. So just how do these new open access journals cover their expenses? After all, they are not a charitable organization and don’t take donations so they have to collect their fees from somewhere.

Approximately one-third of these journals charge the author a publication fee. But many times, private authors cannot afford these fees, so they are paid by grant money or other funding sources. Ideally, new papers undergo rigorous peer review before they are published, as described in an article by The Guardian:4

“A national government or a research council gives funds to a university that ultimately passes these monies along to a researcher. The researcher makes a discovery and writes an article about it. The article is then submitted to a journal.

The journal is responsible for rigorously studying the reported work to make sure it is reliable. This is the heart of quality control: peers – experts working in the same field – anonymously review the work; they challenge it, critique it, ask for new perspectives to be considered, and may even suggest changes in the analysis and presentation.”

If Open Access journals are being paid on a “per paper” basis, it is easy to see how the more articles an Open Access journal can publish, the greater their cash flow. To be clear, peer review problems are not limited to Open Access journals—there is failure with traditional journals as well. So the motivation is a bit precarious, but this does not mean it isn’t a better model that serves you and the community better. Some tweaks may need to be added to protect against these risks.

Harvard Journalist Devises Sting Operation

In an attempt to test this concern, a science journalist at Harvard University by the name of John Bohannon decided to devise a sting operation to test peer-review quality in the “open access media.”

He created a clever scientific paper riddled with clear scientific anomalies that rendered the study meaningless, and then submitted the paper to 304 open access journals over a period of 10 months. He even used fake names and fake universities, which would be caught by most good-quality peer reviewers.

The bogus paper described a simple experiment supposedly showing that lichens can slow cancer cell growth.5 With cancer being such a major concern, and many open access journals partial to natural therapies, there may have been a bias to accept this type of novel therapy. More than half the papers—157 of the 304—were accepted for publication. Public Library of Science (PLOS ONE) was the only journal that called attention to the paper's problems and immediately rejected it. Bohannon published the results of his “experiment” in Science Magazine.6

It is equally important to note that nearly half of the open access journals rejected this fake paper. Ideally, some type of certification agency should do random audits to motivate the half of the journals that weren’t as rigid as they needed to be. But make no mistake, Open Access journals are a massive move in the right direction. It is however a newborn and needs some mentoring. To me, this Science “exposé” was more of a hit piece to discredit their competition and increase their revenues, which would limit your access to this type of valuable information.

Most Research Claims Cannot Be Trusted

Download the Interview Transcript

As you can see above in my previous interview with Dr. Golomb, the non-Open Access conventional journals are no angels, and most are in bed with the drug companies. Our current medical system has been masterfully orchestrated by the drug industry to give the perception of science when it really is a heavily manipulated process designed to elevate their products and boost their profits.

Back in 2005, Dr. John Ioannidis, an epidemiologist at Ioannina School of Medicine in Greece, showed that there is less than a 50 percent chance that the results of any randomly chosen scientific paper will be true.7 Interestingly, this is about the same ratio that the hit piece by the Science journalist found in the Open Access journals. But you sure didn’t see him quote this information. Within just a few years, one-third of the conclusions of all research will have been proved wrong by subsequent studies—even research that makes it into the top medical journals.8

There is a major bias toward publishing studies that show dramatic results, positive results, or results from “hot” competitive fields, and certainly studies that support their major advertisers, which are the drug companies. And it is much easier than you might think for unscrupulous researchers to massage and manipulate data in order to get the result they’re after.

Many drug studies published in leading journals are actually sponsored by drug makers and include deceptive statistical reporting and wording. Studies funded by drug companies favor drugs 80 percent of the time. The flu vaccine is a perfect example of medical manipulation, with research concluding the effectiveness of the vaccines to be as low as one percent. Yet, despite this, flu vaccines are still pushed by mainstream health officials as the “best” way to protect yourself against influenza. Valuable health care workers are even losing their jobs for refusing to accept the flu shot, despite the fact that the scientific basis for the flu vaccine is pathetically weak.

The Hijacking of Science by Industry Giants

In recent decades, scientific research has been undercut by decreased public funding and increased corporate funding of educational institutions. Not only does private industry write fat checks to universities in the form of research grants, but they make it even more lucrative for the schools when the research culminates in patentable products—such as genetically engineered seeds.

Chemical technology companies like Monsanto are “buying” increasingly more friends by funding colleges and universities, where they can gain control over research, science, policy and public opinion. Last year, Monsanto gave a $250,000 grant to the University of Illinois, creating an endowed chair for its Agricultural Communications Program, securing help in disseminating its pro-GMO message. This means that a good deal of science is now corrupt even before the study is performed, with only one goal in mind: the advancement of an agenda. Gone are the days where scientific studies coming from institutes of higher learning really meant something!

Just recently, a study was published that showed nearly ONE MILLION people were killed over five years in Europe through the inappropriate prescription of beta-blockers for non-cardiac surgery. The research serving as the basis for this deadly prescription guideline was published in prestigious peer reviewed journals, showing peer review flaws are not limited to Open Access journals.

It’s become quite clear that instead of evidence-based decision making, we now have decision-based evidence making... Scientific evidence appears to be largely concocted to support an already established corporate agenda, and any scientific investigation that refutes or questions it is squelched by virtually any means.

Science Is Further Perverted by the Media

The public is further deceived by clever and highly paid PR firms, disguised as scientific organizations but set up specifically for the purpose of controlling how the media reports new science and portrays industry. Two examples are Science Media Centre (SMC) and the American Council on Science and Health (ACSH), both of which are heavily funded by industry. The problem is made worse by the fact that many journalists today are not doing their due diligence in fact-checking their sources.

These organizations are anything but independent, from their scientists to their governing boards. SMC has branches all over the world, its primary purpose being to control the press using a team of not-so-independent scientists who spin science news in industry’s favor. SMC “experts” (physicians, research scientists, university professors, etc.) have undisclosed and far-reaching affiliations with biotech giants, including EFSA, Bayer, Pioneer-DuPont, Syngenta, and Monsanto. You’ve likely seen these so-called experts on the evening news spinning scientific information more times than you can count.

How to Get Solid Information in an Era of Confusion

What’s the bottom line? You should be highly skeptical of ANY published study, particularly if it comes from an obscure journal. But you can no longer completely trust even the most respected journals, for all of the reasons already discussed. Always consider the source of the information... Who funded the study and where was it published? Do not accept the findings of any single paper, as scientific results are only reliable after replication and the building of consensus through time. Always look for corroboration.

In order to determine the best course of action in any situation, you've got to use all the resources available to you, including your own common sense and reason, true expert advice, and the experience of those you trust. Remain skeptical but open. Even if it is something I'm saying, you need to realize that YOU are responsible for your and your family's health, not me—and certainly not the biomedical and agriculture industries who will try to sell you their wares and seduce you with innovative (but often risky) “science-based solutions.”

If you're facing a health challenge, make sure your healthcare practitioners really understand health at a foundational level and have extensive experience helping others. In the meantime, be proactive! Making wise lifestyle choices will keep you healthy and decrease your odds of needing risky medical interventions in the future.

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Federalist Papers No. 41. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 19, 1788

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches.

Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?

Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST question.

It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the good sense of the people of America. It may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT, good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.

That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers.

The powers falling within the FIRST class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.

Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.

Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form.

Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-defense.

But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in WAR?

The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch. Were every nation except France now to disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations and rendered her the mistress of the world.

Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.

The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation and her maritime resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United States from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united people. But let it never, for a moment, be forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the Union alone. The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World. The example will be followed here from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of America will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In America the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe.

This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.

Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said that the continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the American Constitution has lengthened this critical period to two years. This is the form in which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the American impose on the Congress appropriations for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature, and that the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the longest admissible term.

Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the representatives, and the representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY by the WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS?

A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the opposition to the federal government is an unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people, of standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public attention to that important subject; and has led to investigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national defense and the preservation of the Union, can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the people, as any establishment that can become necessary, under a united and efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.

The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the insular advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.

The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing government for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an island. The State itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government which now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them.

The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained.

The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national defense, is properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the Constitution. I will address one additional reflection only to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to external—taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted that this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must be a principal source; that at this moment it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population, which must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them.

Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.

Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare."

But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.

The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in article third, are "their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare." The terms of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation!

PUBLIUS