Showing posts with label United State Constitution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United State Constitution. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 13, 2014

Police In All 50 States Now Liable For Abuses? Yes According To Findings.

Map of North Carolina highlighting Wake County
Map of North Carolina highlighting Wake County (Photo credit: Wikipedia)



For Immediate Release

10.27.11

North Carolina Police Departments all over the state have warned their officers to put their personal property (houses, land, cars and other assets) into someone else's name because they may now be subject to lawsuits from the People of North Carolina.

The warning was issued in response to the recent ruling that upheld that the local Police Departments in North Carolina are classified as "private entities" and NOT connected to the state of North Carolina.

Judicial Review Judge, Paul C. Ridgeway, Wake County General Court Of Justice, Superior Court Division, upheld a lower court ruling that most Public Officials / Agencies are "private entities." Judge Ridgeway upheld the earlier (1.17.11) ruling of lower court Judge J. Randall May in Class v. NORTH CAROLINA, Case No. 10 DOT 7047 (now known as 11 CVS 1559).

The police officers will now also have to fund their own Surety Bonds.

Judge Ridgeway's September 15, 2011 ruling creates a conflict in the public's perception of basic government legitimacy because Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr (who recused himself in August 2011) declared in Mr. Class' 4.21.11 hearing that "the Defendants were NOT 'private entities' or 'private contractors' ", but were "public officials."

Are the judges confused ? Are these "government" agencies and officials NOT what they're portraying to their constituents ? Are they immune because they're "private" ? Do we actually have government "agencies" and elect "Public" Officials OR do we deal with "Private Entities" ? Is the public being frauded ? So many questions ! So many conflicts !

Here's some background:

Judge May's original 1.17.11 ruling:
Page 1 http://min.us/mbmc4SfNoQ
Page 2 http://min.us/m9ygLN5Fe
Page 2A (marked for emphasis) http://min.us/myxFZuE3d
Page 3 http://min.us/mbrIPmoLma

Judge Ridgeway's 9.15.11 ruling upholding Judge May is viewable at:
http://min.us/mbi7bovuy0
Mr. Class' filing, that caused Judge Manning's rambling recusal statement, that was the subject of the Ridgeway ruling, is viewable at http://min.us/m6M40HRrB

Judge Manning's rambling recusal: http://min.us/muCmadmgF

Mr. Class' original suit (Case No. 10 DOT 7047) accused the named North Carolina State departments and individuals with charges of Embezzlement of Federal funds from the local political subdivisions, and violations of the Right To Travel issue.

Mr. Class was acting as a Private Attorney General under provisions of an 1866 Federal Act, and was acting on behalf of all People, and political subdivisions "similarly situated" and affected by the charges in his Judicial Review.

Rod Class will be broadcasting live Friday night (10.28.11) at 9:00pm Eastern on his Talkshoe channel at: 
http://www.talkshoe.com/talkshoe/web/talkCast.jsp?masterId=48361

Mr. Class conducts twice weekly radio shows (Tues and Fri) on Talkshoe and archives of previous shows are available at the above link.

Mr. Class may be contacted at itconstitutional@aol.com or his office 704-742-3123 for details regarding the implications of Judge Ridgeway's ruling and the court's behavior in this action. 

The website for all things Rod Class, including other actions he has in play, is athttp://rodclass.com. For a copy of one of the early filings that may have caused both court's consternation: http://www.rayservers.com/blog/rod-class-traffic-filing 

Mr. Class has posted all of his filings, and responses from the court, and the defendants, on the Internet at various sites for the benefit of those in their efforts and interactions with these purported "private entities" 

(contractors), and to ensure that these rulings stay in the public domain and do not disappear !

Other Notes from other sites on this.  

What does this mean? It means that Police can't abuse you or take away your rights and then seek cover and immunity because they were "in the performance of their duties". Get clubbed, get tazed, be unlawfully searched like at those random highway checkpoints, and you'll be able to sue that Officer in Court.

Hey, I know you support Law Enforcement, they keep us safe, or they're supposed to. But as America slides into a Police State you need to know that you aren't just a "subject" to be pushed around.


Naomi Wolf:

WOW: great citizen reporting from Henry John and VERY interesting though ideally we need confirmation: Henry John
3. Judicial Review Judge, Paul C. Ridgeway, Wake County General Court Of Justice, Superior Court Division, upheld a lower court ruling that most Public Officials / Agencies are "private entities." Judge Ridgeway upheld the earlier (1.17.11) ruling of lower court Judge J. Randall May in Class v. NORTH CAROLINA, Case No. 10 DOT 7047 (now known as 11 CVS 1559).

EFFECTIVE IN ALL 50 STATES:
North Carolina Police Departments all over the state have warned all their officers to put their personal property (houses, land, cars and other assets) into someone else's name because they may now be subject to lawsuits from the People of North Carolina.
The warning was issued in response to the recent ruling that upheld that the localPolice Departments in North Carolina are classified as "private entities" and NOT connected to the state of North Carolina.


PDF of the actual motion; Link.

Incredible must read PDF file regarding this matter.


If you are not paying very close attention to this, this does cover all 50 states as the information in this case used Federal law to argue the case.  This means that these same arguments are valid in all 50 states whether or not the states like it.

Every so called official is subject to lawsuits when they violate any of the laws of the state or federal government and that person is not covered by whom they are employed.  In other words, if you seek to sue a police officer, then police officer has no protection from the police department and must pay his or her own court costs for any lawsuit.  So now there is no top cover for anyone in so called government.

So it looks like if some police officer delivers a search warrant to you, it has no validity as it has not come from an actual official government body?  That's what this looks like.  Throw the bums off your property?  Of course this requires a great deal more research, but we are going to stay on top of all of this.  The implications are unreal and a very serious game changer.

  In the state of Virginia, there is no state oversight of localities and this may very well be the reason why.  With this being the case, it may just come out that localities have no jurisdiction on anything and that could open a tremendous amount of lawsuits everywhere.  That includes against all the judges as well.  Anyone wondering why the main stream news isn't touching this story?  

Now here is an Mp3 file that is 27 minutes long that is a must listen to.

http://recordings.talkshoe.com/TC-48361/TS-878978.mp3

Still more.

http://www.nesaranetwork.com/2014/07/14/rod-class-private-call-another-positive-ruling-in-rods-latest-lincolnton-nc-traffic-case-2014/

Undermining The Constitution A HISTORY OF LAWLESS GOVERNMENT (Part 11)

English: The Supreme Court of the United State...
English: The Supreme Court of the United States. Washington, D.C. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
By Thomas James Norton

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 WAS A VICTORY FOR CAESARISM OVER THE STATES AFTER A CONTINUOUS BATTLE FOR TWO DECADES
The most common disregard by Congress and the President of the Tenth Amendment, forbidding the Nation to usurp powers not granted to it, and especially to stay away from the governmental field of the States, has been in its persistent attempts, under the cloak of the Commerce Clause and of the General Welfare Clause, to invade the police field of the States -- for the protection and care of the health, safety, morals, education, and general well-being of the people -- and take jurisdiction of the liberties and living of men.
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States" -- not within the States. The General Welfare Clause is discussed in another section. By NLRA Congress displaced a Union of States by a Nation
After half a century of notable failures and some burrowing successes, that invasion won completely through the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. By that act Con-
161


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gress usurped police control of all workers in the United States.
Could Hamilton have foreseen that, he would have been dumbfounded.
"I confess," he wrote in No. 17 of The Federalist, "I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the General Government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description" -- legislation "for the individual citizens of America."
Briefly, the act declared an "emergency" to exist because of the "burdening" of commerce and the "obstructing" of it by strikes arising out of labor disputes; and, to keep the "flow" of commerce -- not alone interstate commerce covered by the Commerce Clause, but all commerce -- uninterrupted, it set up a Labor Board to which disputes between workers and employers should be taken for hearing and decision. As there could be no suspension of production by any strike that would not "affect" or "obstruct" both intrastate and interstate commerce at least a little, all workers and employers were thus brought under the Commerce Clause, written respecting interstate commerce only, as its language so plainly shows.
Before that only a small part of the workers of the country were within reach of Congress by virtue of the Commerce Clause -- those employed by railroad companies, telegraph and telephone companies, and aviation companies. The great body of them lived and worked subject to the police power of the States.
Representatives of the States in Congress, by passing the act, disparaged and diminished their commonwealths.


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By a complete about-face Supreme Court sustained Congress
Overriding its own decisions for half a century, on the powers of Congress over interstate commerce, and reversing the Judgments of four Circuit Courts of Appeals of three judges each, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler dissenting, upheld (301 U. S. 1) on April 12, 1937, two months after the President proposed to "pack" the Court, and while the proposal was still before Congress, the National Labor Relations Act as a valid exercise of the granted power to Congress to regulate commerce "among the several States." The very title gives the lie to the strained recitations in the Act in a make-believe that it is a regulation of commerce and not a labor law. The promise was in those recitations that the operation of the Act would put an end to strikes and the disorders and losses which had attended them, which was not, of course, a subject of national jurisdiction.
Legislation had numerous precedents
The National Labor Relations Act had been preceded by many acts for the usurpation by Congress and the President of power over concerns of the States. The tyrannies spawned by the Labor Board in applying the National Labor Relations Act were a long time in coming.
When Franklin D. Roosevelt was Governor of New York, he protested in behalf of the States against the dishonest and lawless use of the Commerce Clause by Congress and the President to occupy forbidden ground in the States. Speaking on July 16, 1929, before a conference of governors at New London, Connecticut, he condemned the "stretching" of the Commerce Clause by Con-


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gress to cover cases not embraced by grants of power to it in the Constitution (italics inserted):
Governor Roosevelt declared against such legislation
"Our Nation has been a successful experiment in democratic government because the individual States have waived in only a few instances their sovereign rights. . . .
"But there is a tendency, and to my mind a grievous tendency, on the part of our National Government, to encroach, on one excuse or another, more and more upon State supremacy. The elastic theory of interstate commerce, for instance, has been stretched almost to the breaking point to cover certain regulatory powers desired by Washington. But in many cases this has been due to a failure of the States, themselves, by common agreement, to pass legislation necessary to meet certain conditions."
Importance of commerce in history
The Commerce Clause, for the strict observance of which Governor Roosevelt was rightly solicitous, contains a principle dating back as far as Magna Carta (1215), when King John, faced by armed men, signed an agreement not to interfere in the right of Englishmen to go to and fro in commerce, and abroad and return, except only in an exigency of war.
Englishmen in commerce were "in pursuit of happiness," which the Declaration of Independence later de-


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nominated a right from the Creator, for the protection of which "governments are instituted among men."
The speeches and writings of Edmund Burke in behalf of the American colonists make clear that the restrictions on commerce by the government of England were far more burdensome and intolerable than was "taxation without representation," usually given as the cause of the American Revolution. All products for sale had to go to England -- in English ships. All things that they had to buy they were obliged to buy in England -- for transportation in English ships. Raw material ready for manufacture had to go to England for that purpose. This interference with commerce (only one of many hard regulations) destroyed shipbuilding, which had become of great importance, put an end to manufacture, and cut off commercial communication with other countries.
Constitution designed to make commerce free
It was obstruction by States of this right to engage in commerce that contributed much to the breakdown of the government under the Articles of Confederation. And the third grant of power to Congress in the Constitution which followed (after taxing and borrowing) is "to regulate commerce . . . among the several States."
Congress is authorized to regulate commerce so that it will not be obstructed as it was before -- that is, it is to promote commerce. It is not to obstruct it affirmatively, any more than the early States could rightly do so, by legislation like the Norris-LaGuardia Law, which cripples men in commerce in the maintenance in court of their constitutional rights -- and their inherent rights. It is not to obstruct commerce negatively by failure to guard the


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rights of those engaged in it, as in the toleration of costly and destructive strikes.
Commerce most important activity of man
The history of commerce makes clear that legally it is the most important right of men, not to be trifled with by kings or others in power. Nevertheless, for a third of a century obstructions to commerce have been so nearly continuous as to condemn the Government at Washington for default of duty under the Commerce Clause.
Five years before the National Labor Relations Act of Congress, Governor Roosevelt condemned illicit ideas which he afterwards sanctioned as President. In a radio address in 1930 he again took up States' rights and home rule and said that with "a great number ... of vital problems of Government, such as the conduct of public utilities, of banks, of insurance companies, of agriculture, of education, of social welfare, and of a dozen other important features . . .Washington must not be encouraged to interfere." (Italics inserted.) But Roosevelt, like Supreme Court, did turn-around
With every one of those "features," Congress, taking orders from President Roosevelt, did interfere, to the denial of the liberty of man to engage unhampered by his Government or by his fellows in pursuits which had never before been regarded in the United States as subjects for political meddling. Never before regarded, because no fancy had ever found in the Constitution anything even suggesting the power in Congress to engage in or control such activities.


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Yet, during the first eleven years of the Act, from 1935 to 1945 inclusive, there were 37,383 work stoppages, involving 16,827,305 workers and the loss of wages for 175,896,235 man-days.
N.L.R.B. failed of purpose proclaimed
For the eleven years before the National Labor Relations Act, 1924 to 1934, inclusive, the work stoppages were 11,565, affecting 5,829,339 workers, about one-third of the number involved in stoppages during the 11 years following the Act.[1]
Even more deplorable than those losses to the workers was the brake put on production of food, clothing, housing, and other things required by a people in sore need, who had shown every willingness to do their part in the conduct of the war.
Many of those strikes were attended by the worst disorders, sometimes by bloodshed. Plants were seized by strikers and the owners excluded from them. Picketing was of the most violent sort.
Against those manifestations of lawlessness, which appeared in all parts of the country, the authorities of the States did nothing, or next to nothing. The United States looked on. There was generally a breakdown of law.
1. For the six years from 1940 to 1945, inclusive, covering the whole time of World War II, strikes took place as follows:
In 1940there were 2,508strikes
19414,288 
19422,968 
19433,752 
19444,956 
19454,750 
Total23,222 




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A picture of countrywide performances
What was going on all over the country all during the war is illustrated by this official statement of the Employment Relations Board of the State of Wisconsin, issued on December 27, 1946 (italics added):
"It can no longer be assumed, as it was when the first order of this board was made in May of this year, that the leadership of the organization now on strike intends to be law-abiding citizens.
"Events transpiring since the entry of the order and its enforcement by a judgment of the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County clearly indicate that the leadership of this union entertains no respect for the law, agencies designated to administer it, or the courts, but intends to prevent by any methods, legal or illegal, the use of the company's premises by the company, or the pursuit of work by employees of the company desiring to work."
Previous orders of the Board had been disregarded. As the quotation shows, the strike at the plant of Allis-Chalmers had been on since May preceding. All the powers of unionism had been concentrated on Allis-Chalmers to compel it to establish the closed shop and thereby deny to Americans the liberty to work under conditions of their own choosing.
Was the conduct described in Wisconsin treasonable?
The Constitution defines one of only two acts of "treason against the United States" as "adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort."


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Were not the unceasing strikes which were waged in essential industries from one end of the war to the other of great "aid and comfort" to Germany and Japan?
What did the Department of Justice of the United States do to protect the Government in its war endeavor and the American in his liberty?
Nothing.
Not until the head of the United Mine Workers notified the Secretary of the Interior, who was operating the coal mines under one of the many illegal seizures of property, without compensation, committed by Government during the war, that it would terminate its working agreement at midnight, November 20, 1946, did the United States show mettle befitting such an occasion. This time it had been put on the spot.
Government of great Republic driven to corner
The United States could not say that the duty to act was on the States, or use any other of the evasions which it had employed as encouragement to strikes against private industries. So it had its Department of Justice bring a suit on November 18 for injunction in the United States Court in the District of Columbia, which immediately issued an order restraining the head of the union and the miners from carrying out the notice. Nevertheless, a gradual walkout of miners began on November 18, and by November 20 "a full-blown strike was in progress," the Supreme Court said in sustaining the action of the trial judge in fining for contempt the head of the union $10,000 and the miners as a body $3,500,000. It authorized


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the reduction of the fine imposed on the miners to $700,000 on condition that they permanently obey the order of the court.
Simple case pointed way to managing labor disputes
That shows how nicely those disputes could be handled if Congress and the States (which have really fostered labor troubles) would remit them to the courts, where all other people having disputes are obliged to go. Congress does not interfere in controversies between individuals, or between corporations, or between corporations and individuals, or between States, or between associations of men. Why should it interfere in disputes between employee and employer?
The questions in dispute are justiciable (for the Judiciary) where negotiation or arbitration fails and the next step is the strike, with suspension of production for the needs of the people and the country, and disorder, sabotage, and personal peril. At that point society must assert its paramount interest, as it did in the instance just described, and require the adjudication of the dispute in its courts.
Labor decisions show courts afford remedy
Since the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 holding (262 U. S. 522) invalid a statute of Kansas setting up an Industrial Court to hear and decide controversies between employee and employer, including differences over wages, the interest of the public in the continuity of service has become more and more recognized. The National Labor Relations Act of July, 1935,


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brought all of the employees of the country within the Commerce Clause of the Constitution under the pretense that it was necessary to prevent strikes from interrupting the free flow of commerce to the discomfiture and damage of the people. And in 1934 the Supreme Court sustained (291 U. S. 502) a law of New York setting up a Milk Control Board to fix maximum and minimum prices for milk, thus taking away the right of the parties to contract. The welfare of the public and the interest of the Nation have been so grossly disregarded during the last two decades that views on "the liberty of contract," and on "the right to strike" and plunge society into confusion and distress, have undergone change. The act of the legislature of Kansas setting up the Industrial Court would probably be sustained today.[2]
Labor controversy has ceased to be personal to parties
When, for illustration, employment was on a small scale, the law was that an employee assumed the risk of injury by the carelessness of a fellow worker and he was therefore not entitled to damages from the employer. But as employment became stupendous, laws making the employer liable (as an operating cost) for injuries to a worker, whether there was negligence or not, were upheld by the courts as valid exercise of the police power of the States
2. Long after that part of the text was written, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion rendered on January 3, 1949, sustaining a law of North Carolina and a constitutional provision of Nebraska forbidding employers to enter into contracts obligating themselves to exclude persons from employment because they are or are not members of labor unions, examined the case of the Industrial Court of Kansas and said that hours and wages can be fixed by law in the public interest. That fulfills the prophecy of the text.


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in the interest of society. So the controversy between employee and employer is no longer a matter exclusively personal to them.
Congress should get out of labor politics, in which it has too long performed a discreditable as well as an unconstitutional part. Government now conducted with respect to elections
The capers that have been cut at Washington during the last three decades make one wonder whether sight has been entirely lost of the purpose of Government as laid down in the Declaration of Independence, namely, to secure man against his fellows, and more especially against those whom he has chosen for his servants in public office. The activities of administrations have been plainly to favor, in view of the next election, great voting blocs like the labor organizations, the people on the farms (who, subsidized for years, turned the Presidential election in 1948), and the political bosses who "deliver" the votes of many corrupt cities. The platforms of both parties have offered shamelessly to "give every thing to every body" in those classes.
Meanwhile, the people, who set up Government "to secure these rights" which came to them from the Creator, "among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," are stripped of their possessions with a system of ruthlessness rarely exampled in the history of tyranny.
Although the Criminal Code of the United States provides that a fine of $100 and imprisonment for six months, or both, shall be imposed upon anyone who shall "knowingly and wilfully obstruct the passage of the mail," and


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although the opening of mail is severely punished, the Executive Department of the Government took no action respecting the obstructing and opening in 1937 of mail addressed to Americans engaged in their work and surrounded by pickets trying unlawfully to deny to them this liberty.
The nonaction by the Chief Executive, who is enjoined by the Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," looked to the beholder like sanction of the illegalities.
Washington friendly to the sit-down strike
While the Government at Washington assumed to legislate by the National Labor Relations Act respecting all labor, regardless of whether it might be engaged in interstate commerce (of which only it has jurisdiction), a spokesman for the White House let it be known that sit-down strikes in various parts of the country, by which owners were forcibly dispossessed of their property by their employees, were matters of concern, not to the Nation, but to the States! As before indicated, the debilitated States generally concurred in such strikes.
The Secretary of Labor was reported by the Press to question at first whether the seizure and detention of plants by sit-down workers was illegal!
While employees of a steel manufactory at Canton, Ohio, were working under siege by an army of pickets, airplanes dropped leaflets to discourage the workers, saying, "Our members are well fed and happy. Relief is being arranged for their families. Four departments of the United States Government are fighting for our side."
On March 23, 1947, the Associated Press reported from


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Milwaukee that "the Allis-Chalmers strike, one of the most bloody and turbulent in recent history, ended today when the striking UAW-CIO Local 248 voted to return to work without a contract."
That shows that the workers themselves had tired of the long misleading by their officers.
Communism in strikes in United States
As the chief principle of the tactics of Communism is to provoke disorder and profit by it, the foregoing record, made mostly while the Republic was in the perils of war, compels the question whether Communist influences guided that disgrace to "government under law."
Earl Browder, for years head of the Communist Party in the United States, and twice a candidate for the Presidency of this Nation, reported to the Congress of the International Communist Party in Moscow on July 18, 1935:
"How was our party able to penetrate the masses and emerge from isolation? A great role was played by leaders in the strike movement and in the work of the party among the unemployed. In some of the most important strikes, the San Francisco general strike for one, the Communist Party had a decisive, determining influence."
And the great Government of the United States was not only unable to deport the alien who fomented and led that strike, but it also came around to issuing citizenship papers to him!
In What Is Communism? it is made clear (p. 163) by Browder, a native of the United States, that the plan of Communism is to take away liberty and property by armed force:
"The Revolution is carried out by the great masses of the


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toilers. The Communist Party, as the vanguard of the most conscious toilers, acts as their organizer and guide."
And again (pp. 164, 165):
"In the revolutionary situation the Communist Party . . . wins some of the armed forces to its side, and leads the effective majority of the population to the seizure of State power. . . . Above all, they need the armed forces."
An attempt to destroy an industry
Although not so wide in its reach to people as the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the law of Congress of 1886, forty-nine years before (amended and extended in 1902), taxing oleomargarine ¼¢ a pound, and 10¢ a pound when colored, was fully as bad an invasion of the police field of the States. Agriculturists, a voting power, put the bills through Congress in protection of dairy butter. In addition to the destructive tax on the colored article (while colored butter was not taxed), the heavy license tax on manufacturers, on wholesalers, and on retailers, and the regulations regarding packing, labeling, and permits were obstructive and costly. The manufacturers abandoned coloring and left that to the consumers. Notwithstanding the handicap, oleomargarine grew steadily in favor. It was used in the navies of the world, including our own.
Those laws, attacked as intended to destroy an industry, as an encroachment upon the police field, and as working a deprivation of property without due process of law, were sustained (195 U. S. 27) in 1904 by the Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion by Justice White, with dissent by Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brown and Peckham.
In 1888 the Supreme Court had upheld (127 U. S. 678)


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a law of Pennsylvania (1885) which forbade the making and selling of anything to be used as butter, or in lieu of it, out of any substance "other than unadulterated milk or cream." Justice Field dissented from the opinion written by Justice Harlan chiefly on the ground that the Court had lost the distinction between regulation and prohibition. To be sure, a State may regulate the manufacture of foods so as to secure purity and prevent fraud. But Pennsylvania had no more right or power to suppress the manufacture of oleomargarine, made and sold without deception, than it had to prevent the making of marmalade. Wide as the police power is, it must be exerted with regard for rationality, liberty, and the right to property.
Of the case arising in Pennsylvania, Judge Dillon, once on the Federal Bench, wrote in Municipal Corporations and also in Law and Jurisprudence in England and America this sound and complete comment:
"The record of the conviction of Powell for selling without any deception a healthful and nutritious article of food makes one's blood tingle."
If the police power of Pennsylvania could not extend that far, how could Congress, without any police power at all, get a seat in the game of politics?
In March, 1950, a discreditable record of 64 years was ended by Congress when it repealed the legislation by a vote of 202 to 106 in the House and 59 to 20 in the Senate.
The unbelievable guilelessness of the American
In all worlds of fabulists and fictionists no state of things is exhibited which is at once so preposterous and so potentially calamitous as that there should be tolerated a party


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against freedom and possessions in a land where the Constitution twice guarantees security to Liberty, Property, and Life!
Why have Senators and Representatives, who have been sent by the people of the States through the years to represent them in the Congress of the Union of States, failed to maintain their States in their constitutional position in that Union? They have made the State a kind of satrapy of the central power.
What Congressmen and Governors have done to sovereign States
The degraded position to which the States have descended in the estimation of our Government was shown by a meeting in 1944 in St. Louis of the governors of 26 States, who deplored the fact that for 11 years not a Governor had been called to the White House for consultation.[3]
When President Truman took office in 1945, the Republican members of Congress proceeded to the White House
3. The bill of particulars drawn by the governors proposed the resumption by the States of their constitutional functions. It condemned the acquisition by the United States of the lands of the States, the usurpation by Washington of unemployment insurance and unemployment services, the derogatory "conditions' fixed by the Federal Government to grants in aid of States for public works, the attempt of the Administration "to undermine and abandon our traditional National Guard," the entry of the United States into competition with insurance companies, the plans to control from the National Capital the field of medicine, the development of water resources without any recognition of the superior rights of the States, and some other acts of total indifference to the existence of local governments, as leaving for ten years "entire regions of our country" without "representation in the Cabinet or administrative agencies of the Federal Government." The crowning insolence was the failure of the President to invite any governor to the White House for an exchange of views.
Of course, the things complained of were brought about by the incompetence or delinquency of members of Congress from the States.


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to tell him that they would help him in all ways consistent with their political beliefs. On leaving the White House, the Republican leader in the Senate said to newsmen that he had not been on the premises since the party in power took office in 1933.
Well, the governors complaining at St. Louis were not heard in protest when the representatives of their States in Congress were originating or supporting bills for weakening their commonwealths and widening the authority of the National Government. And as for the treatment of members of Congress by the White House, they had let go of their constitutional reins.
At the 42nd annual convention of the governors of the States, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, on June 19, 1950, there was a quite general expression of the view that "Federal aid" should be relied upon by the States to carry their projects of flood control, reclamation, irrigation, electric power, and the like.
The presiding governor sought to prevent "stump speeches on the obligation Washington has in the development of the West." But the governor of California thought it "perfectly logical to ask the Federal Government for help in irrigation, reclamation, and power projects: we repay every cent and pay interest on Federal moneys going into such projects."
No one rose to inform him that the Constitution gives no authority to Congress to lend money at interest or otherwise for any purpose. Nor was he reminded that banks, and others having the right to lend, provided the necessary money for all great projects in the building of the United States from the beginning down.
The governor of New Jersey protested the proposal for


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Federal aid. He could not understand how any governor could "go on record for a balanced Federal budget and at the same time have his hand out for millions for reclamation, irrigation, and public power." He said that "New Jersey would have nothing to do with Washington, that it can and does finance its own projects, and at cheaper interest rates than the Federal Government can borrow money."
It is somewhat reassuring that one governor out of 48 had been sufficiently educated to declare for constitutional procedure.
The meeting of governors revealed the great need, not so much for "Federal aid," as for a school for giving constitutional instruction to the executives of the States. Such a school might accept members of Congress. Something must be done toward teaching those in office.
In the days of the horse and buggy
In the autobiography of Senator Hoar it is said that if any group went to the White House and brought back directions on policy, they would be made to regret it. For sixteen years or more the White House has been permitted by Congress to usurp direction of policy.
The States must back-track to where the writers of the Constitution set them -- or where they set themselves, for they made the Constitution.
And the schools must so teach the Constitution that governors of States will know better than to resign their great offices to take inferior seats in Congress.
And the President must be elected by the constitutional method.
When the States have exercised the power which they


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reserved to themselves by section 2 of Article I, to prescribe the qualifications of voters for members of Congress as well as for candidates for local offices, by making a certificate of graduation in the study of the principles of our constitutional system a condition of registering for voting, then we shall have a better situation in Congress and out.
And in the days ahead
And when the States have abolished the straight ticket by restoring or putting into effect the Australian ballot, which was emasculated for the aid of the illiterate followers of political leaders or bosses, then American elections will express the competence of the people for self-government.
And when the States have brought back the constitutional election of the President and put him in his place to stay, and thereby removed the need for Corrupt Practices Acts of Congress, our country will then be again "the land of the free."

The States, which intended when they wrote the Constitution to manage the country largely, should return to that duty.

From the great folks over at Barefoot's World.  

Wednesday, August 6, 2014

Do We Have a Democracy ?

By; Sue M Long    Above Photo Art by:  Chuck Thompson of TTC Media, (C 2014)

Have you ever pledged allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Democracy for which it stands?

Of course not. But then, what difference does it make? Don’t we have a Democracy? Isn’t it just a matter of semantics?

Actually, a democracy and a republic are two entirely different forms of government. And, understanding the difference is vital to preserving what liberties we still have left. A republic is a government of laws whereas a democracy is government by majority rule.

It has been said that a lynch mob is democracy in action. The mob wants to hang you and you only get one vote. But if you believe someone is innocent until proven guilty, that they deserve their day in court and that a jury of their peers should decide their fate, then you believe in a nation of laws.

Said another way, democracy is five wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for lunch. If you were the sheep, which would you rather live in — a republic or a democracy? A gentler version is this: After a hearty breakfast of candy bars and
jellybeans, a meal fairly decided by majority vote; you, your spouse and three children take a vote on whether the kids go to school that day. The implications of democratic government are clear and dire.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention held in 1787 behind closed doors resulted in the formation of our Constitution. When Benjamin Franklin emerged, he was asked what have we got? Without hesitation, Franklin replied, “A republic, if you can keep it.”

Our founding fathers were well aware of the differences between a republic and a democracy. They revered the former and hated and feared the latter. As a result, nowhere in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of the U.S. do you find the word democracy. Indeed, the Constitution not only proclaimed that our federal government should be a republic, it mandated that “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government.”

James Madison, often referred to as “the father of the Constitution,” said “…democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they are violent in their deaths.

The principles of republican vs democratic used to be widely understood and commonly accepted. John Marshall, chief justice of the Supreme Court from 1801 until 1835, said that, “Between a balanced republic and a democracy, the difference is like that between order and chaos.” Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “Democracy becomes a government of bullies tempered by editors.”
But a persistent campaign to brainwash us into believing we were a democracy has reached the point where today if you were to take a toll, the preponderant number of people would say that we are a democracy. Just note how many legislators and TV commentators refer to our democracy in glowing terms - showing their total ignorance of just what form of government we
actually have. And, there are those who know full well the difference but are bent on our no longer being “the land of the free.”
 
It was Lord Woodhouselee who wrote that a democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters discover they can vote themselves largesse from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates promising the most benefits from the public treasury, with the result that a democracy always collapses over
loose fiscal policy, always followed by a dictatorship.
 
Let’s use the opportunities we still have to preserve our Republic.




Committee for Constitutional Government, Post Office Box 972, Gloucester, VA 23061

Federalist Papers No. 47. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts.

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 30, 1788.

MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts.
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts.
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point.
The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn.
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote.
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution examined by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department.
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner." Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR. Were it joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR." Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.
If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments, and has qualified the doctrine by declaring "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other AS THE NATURE OF A FREE GOVERNMENT WILL ADMIT; OR AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT CHAIN OF CONNECTION THAT BINDS THE WHOLE FABRIC OF THE CONSTITUTION IN ONE INDISSOLUBLE BOND OF UNITY AND AMITY." Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The President, who is the head of the executive department, is the presiding member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting vote in case of a tie. The executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the legislative department, and his council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of state are also appointed by the legislature. And the members of the judiciary department are appointed by the executive department.
The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental article of liberty. It declares "that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them." This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two legislative branches. Lastly, a number of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative department. As the appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is in its nature an executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves.
I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention.
The constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless, to the executive magistrate, a partial control over the legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like control to the judiciary department; and even blends the executive and judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. In its council of appointment members of the legislative are associated with the executive authority, in the appointment of officers, both executive and judiciary. And its court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors is to consist of one branch of the legislature and the principal members of the judiciary department.
The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than any of the preceding. The governor, who is the executive magistrate, is appointed by the legislature; is chancellor and ordinary, or surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and president, with a casting vote, of one of the legislative branches. The same legislative branch acts again as executive council of the governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of the judiciary department are appointed by the legislative department and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other.
According to the constitution of Pennsylvania, the president, who is the head of the executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an executive council, he appoints the members of the judiciary department, and forms a court of impeachment for trial of all officers, judiciary as well as executive. The judges of the Supreme Court and justices of the peace seem also to be removable by the legislature; and the executive power of pardoning in certain cases, to be referred to the same department. The members of the executive council are made EX-OFFICIO justices of peace throughout the State.
In Delaware, the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the legislative department. The speakers of the two legislative branches are vice-presidents in the executive department. The executive chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the legislative branches constitutes the Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the legislative department in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the States, it appears that the members of the legislature may at the same time be justices of the peace; in this State, the members of one branch of it are EX-OFFICIO justices of the peace; as are also the members of the executive council. The principal officers of the executive department are appointed by the legislative; and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. All officers may be removed on address of the legislature.
Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms; declaring that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Her constitution, notwithstanding, makes the executive magistrate appointable by the legislative department; and the members of the judiciary by the executive department.
The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Her constitution declares, "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that the justices of county courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly." Yet we find not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the inferior courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his executive council, are appointable by the legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the legislature; and that all the principal offices, both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department. The executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in the legislative department.
The constitution of North Carolina, which declares "that the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other," refers, at the same time, to the legislative department, the appointment not only of the executive chief, but all the principal officers within both that and the judiciary department.
In South Carolina, the constitution makes the executive magistracy eligible by the legislative department. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the judiciary department, including even justices of the peace and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the executive department, down to captains in the army and navy of the State.
In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other," we find that the executive department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature; and the executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the legislature.
In citing these cases, in which the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State governments. I am fully aware that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating the sacred maxim of free government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper.
PUBLIUS

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