Is General Motors Covering Up Serious Ignition Switch Issues?

The Robert F. Kennedy Department of Justice Building in Washington, D.C., headquarters of the United States Department of Justice. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

You may have seen in the news that General Motors is being investigated for a massive cover-up of a serious flaw in some of its cars: The ignition switches sometimes turn off while driving, shutting down the cars' power steering, brakes, and airbags. I believe this flaw and this cover-up is why my cousin Sarah is dead.Now I am fighting to get her justice.

My cousin Sarah was one of the sweetest, most caring people I knew. She was a freshman in college, and her dream was to be a pediatric cardiologist. But one morning in 2009, as Sarah was driving home to see her new puppy, her car veered off the road and hit a tree. We thought she might have fallen asleep behind the wheel, but then we learned her car should have been recalled and may have shut off while she was driving. Her airbag never deployed. She didn't have a chance.

Congress and the Department of Justice are investigating GM's massive cover-up, which caused the deaths of at least 13 people. Cases like this often result in monetary settlements, but I think it's ridiculous that the people responsible for so many deaths could come away with no consequences whatsoever.

According to the investigations happening now, GM first became aware of the problem with their ignition switches in 2001. The first reported death occurred in 2005, which prompted a Congressional investigation, but still, cars like Sarah's remained on the road. We recently found out that Sarah's car was one of 2.6 million that should have been recalled.

The faulty part in the GM cars cost only 57 cents to replace. Instead of spending a measly 57 cents, GM was willing to let my cousin Sarah and at least 13 other people die.

GM is far from the only company to have done something like this -- in fact, the government just completed a similar yearlong investigation of Toyota. But these investigations almost never lead to criminal charges, which is why corporations keep behaving this way. This time, for Sarah and the other victims, things will be different. This time, the people who caused their deaths will have to answer for what they did.

Karlie Brighton Yarbrough
Jacksonville, Florida

Related articles

• Governor McAuliffe Announces Successful Launch of DMV/VDH Vital Records Partnership
• GMO-Science Takes a Blow as Studies Are Retracted
• Tesla Motors - The Car Company They're Scared Of And Why
• Four Horsemen - Feature Documentary - How The WOrld Really Works
• How Pesticide Companies Silence Scientific Dissent
• Unethical Journal Retraction Fuels Mistrust in GMO Science

Anti Federalist Papers No. 41-43B – Powers of The Constitution Continued

. . . In the present state of mankind, and of conducting war, the government of every nation must have power to raise and keep up regular troops. The question is, how shall this power be lodged? In an entire government, as in Great Britain, where the people assemble by their representatives in one legislature, there is no difficulty; it is of course properly lodged in that legislature. But in a confederated republic, where the organization consists of a federal head, and local governments, there is no one part in which it can be solely, and safely lodged. By Art. 1. , Sect. 8. , "congress shall have power to raise and support armies," etc. By Art. I. , Sect. 10. , "no state, without the consent of congress, shall keep troops, or ships of war, in time of peace. " It seems fit the union should direct the raising of troops, and the union may do it in two ways: by requisitions on the states, or by direct taxes. The first is most conformable to the federal plan, and safest; and it may be improved, by giving the union power, by its own laws and officers, to raise the state's quota that may neglect, and to charge it with the expense; and by giving a fixed quorum of the state legislatures power to disapprove the requisition. There would be less danger in this power to raise troops, could the state governments keep a proper control over the purse and over the militia.

But after all the precautions we can take, without evidently fettering the union too much, we must give a large accumulation of powers to it, in these and other respects. There is one check, which, I think may be added with great propriety - that is, no land forces shall be kept up, but by legislative acts annually passed by congress, and no appropriation of monies for their support shall be for a longer term than one year. This is the constitutional practice in Great Britain, and the reasons for such checks in the United States appear to be much stronger. We may also require that these acts be passed by a special majority, as before mentioned. There is another mode still more guarded, and which seems to be founded in the true spirit of a federal system: it seems proper to divide those powers we can with safety, lodge them in no one member of the government alone; yet substantially to preserve their use, and to insure duration to the government by modifying the exercise of them - it is to empower congress to raise troops by direct levies, not exceeding a given number, say 2000 in time of peace, and 12,000 in a time of war, and for such further troops as may be wanted, to raise them by requisitions qualified ,as before mentioned.

By the above recited clause no state shall keep troops, etc. , in time of peace - this clearly implies it may do it in time of war. This must be on the principle that the union cannot defend all parts of the republic, and suggests an idea very repugnant to the general tendency of the system proposed, which is to disarm the state governments. A state in a long war may collect forces sufficient to take the field against the neighboring states. This clause was copied from the confederation, in which it was of more importance than in the plan proposed, because under this the separate states, probably, will have but small revenues.

By Article I. , section 8. , congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. It is to be observed, that the separate states have ever been in possession of the power, and in the use of it, of making bankrupt-laws, militia laws, and laws in some other cases, respecting which, the new constitution, when adopted, will give the union power to legislate, etc. But no words are used by the constitution to exclude the jurisdiction of the several states, and whether they will be excluded or not, or whether they and the union will have concurrent jurisdiction or not, must be determined by inference, and from the nature of the subject. If the power, for instance, to make uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, is in its nature indivisible, or incapable of being exercised by two legislatures independently, or by one in aid of the other, then the states are excluded, and cannot legislate at all on the subject, even though the union should neglect or find it impracticable to establish uniform bankrupt laws. How far the union will find it practicable to do this, time only can fully determine.

When we consider the extent of the country, and the very different ideas of the different parts in it, respecting credit, and the mode of making men's property liable for paying their debts, we may, I think with some degree of certainty, conclude that the union never will be able to establish such laws. But if practicable, it does not appear to me, on further reflection, that the union ought to have the power. It does not appear to me to be a power properly incidental to a federal head, and, I believe, no one ever possessed it. It is a power that will immediately and extensively interfere with the internal police of the separate states, especially with their administering justice among their own citizens. By giving this power to the union, we greatly extend the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, as all questions arising on bankrupt laws, being laws of the union . . . [indeed], almost all civil causes may be drawn into those courts. We must be sensible how cautious we ought to be in extending unnecessarily the jurisdiction of those courts for reasons I need not repeat.

This article of power too, will considerably increase, in the hands of the union, an accumulation of powers, some of a federal and some of an un-federal nature, [already] too large without it. The constitution provides that congress shall have the sole and exclusive government of what is called the federal city, a place not exceeding ten miles square, and of all places ceded for forts, dock-yards, etc. I believe this is a novel kind of provision in a federal republic; it is repugnant to the spirit of such a government, and must be founded in an apprehension of a hostile disposition between the federal head and the state governments. And it is not improbable that the sudden retreat of congress from Philadelphia first gave rise to it. With this apprehension, we provide, the government of the union shall have secluded places, cities, and castles of defense, which no state laws whatever shall invade. When we attentively examine this provision in all its consequences, it opens to view scenes almost without bounds.

A federal, or rather a national city, ten miles square, containing a hundred square miles, is about four times as large as London; and for forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings, congress may possess a number of places or towns in each state. It is true, congress cannot have them unless the state legislatures cede them; but when once ceded, they never can be recovered. And though the general temper of the legislatures may be averse to such cessions, yet many opportunities and advantages may be taken of particular times and circumstances of complying assemblies, and of particular parties, to obtain them. It is not improbable, that some considerable towns or places, in some intemperate moments, or influenced by anti-republican principles, will petition to be ceded for the purposes mentioned in the provision. There are men, and even towns, in the best republics, which are often fond of withdrawing from the government of them, whenever occasion shall present. The case is still stronger. If the provision in question holds out allurements to attempt to withdraw, the people of a state must ever be subject to state as well as federal taxes; but the federal city and places will be subject only to the latter, and to them by no fixed proportion. Nor of the taxes raised in them, can the separate states demand any account of congress. These doors opened for withdrawing from the state governments entirely, may, on other accounts, be very alluring and pleasing to those anti-republican men who prefer a place under the wings of courts.

If a federal town be necessary for the residence of congress and the public officers, it ought to be a small one, and the government of it fixed on republican and common law principles, carefully enumerated and established by the constitution. it is true, the states, when they shall cede places, may stipulate that the laws and government of congress in them shall always be formed on such principles. But it is easy to discern, that the stipulations of a state, or of the inhabitants of the place ceded, can be of but little avail against the power and gradual encroachments of the union. The principles ought to be established by the federal constitution, to which all states are parties; but in no event can there be any need of so large a city and places for forts, etc. , totally exempted from the laws and jurisdictions of the state governments.

If I understand the constitution, the laws of congress, constitutionally made, will have complete and supreme jurisdiction to all federal purposes, on every inch of ground in the United States, and exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, and this by the highest authority, the consent of the people. Suppose ten acres at West Point shall be used as a fort of the union, or a sea port town as a dockyard: the laws of the union, in those places, respecting the navy, forces of the union, and all federal objects, must prevail, be noticed by all judges and officers, and executed accordingly. And I can discern no one reason for excluding from these places, the operation of state laws, as to mere state purpose for instance, for the collection of state taxes in them; recovering debts; deciding questions of property arising within them on state laws; punishing, by state laws, theft, trespasses, and offenses committed in them by mere citizens against the state law.

The city, and all the places in which the union shall have this exclusive jurisdiction, will be immediately under one entire government, that of the federal head, and be no part of any state, and consequently no part of the United States. The inhabitants of the federal city and places, will be as much exempt from the laws and control of the state governments, as the people of Canada or Nova Scotia will be. Neither the laws of the states respecting taxes, the militia, crimes of property, will extend to them; nor is there a single stipulation in the constitution, that the inhabitants of this city, and these places, shall be governed by laws founded on principles of freedom. All questions, civil and criminal, arising on the laws of these places, which must be the laws of congress, must be decided in the federal courts; and also, all questions that may, by such judicial fictions as these courts may consider reasonable, be supposed to arise within this city, or any of these places, may be brought into these courts. By a very common legal fiction, any personal contract may be supposed to have been made in any place. A contract made in Georgia may be supposed to have been made in the federal city; the courts will admit the fiction. . . . Every suit in which an inhabitant of a federal district may be a party, of course may be instituted in the federal courts; also, every suit in which it may be alleged and not denied, that a party in it is an inhabitant of such a district; also, every suit to which a foreign state or subject, the union, a state, citizens of different states in fact, or by reasonable legal fictions, may be a party or parties. And thus, by means of bankrupt laws, federal districts, etc. , almost all judicial business, I apprehend may be carried into the federal courts, without essentially departing from the usual course of judicial proceedings. The courts in Great Britain have acquired their powers, and extended very greatly their jurisdictions by such fiction and suppositions as I have mentioned. The constitution, in these points, certainly involves in it principles, and almost hidden cases, which may unfold and in time exhibit consequences we hardly think of. The power of naturalization, when viewed in connection with the judicial powers and cases, is, in my mind, of very doubtful extent. By the constitution itself, the citizens of each state will be naturalized citizens of every state, to the general purposes of instituting suits, claiming the benefits of the laws, etc.

And in order to give the federal courts jurisdiction of an action, between citizens of the same state, in common acceptation - may not a court allow the plaintiff to say, he is a citizen of one state, and the defendant a citizen of another without carrying legal fictions so far, by any means, as they have been carried by the courts of King's Bench and Exchequer, in order to bring causes within their cognizance? Further, the federal city and districts, will be totally distinct from any state, and a citizen of a state will not of course be subject of any of them. And to avail himself of the privileges and immunities of them, must he not be naturalized by congress in them? And may not congress make any proportion of the citizens of the states naturalized subjects of the federal city and districts, and thereby entitle them to sue or defend, in all cases, in the federal courts? I have my doubts, and many sensible men, I find, have their doubts, on these points. And we ought to observe, they must be settled in the courts of law, by their rules, distinctions, and fictions. To avoid many of these intricacies and difficulties, and to avoid the undue and unnecessary extension of the federal judicial powers, it appears to me that no federal districts ought to be allowed, and no federal city or town - except perhaps a small town, in which the government shall be republican, but in which congress shall have no jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the states. Can the union want, in such a town, any thing more than a right to the soil to which it may set its buildings, and extensive jurisdiction over the federal buildings, and property, its own members, officers, and servants in it? As to all federal objects, the union will have complete jurisdiction over them of course any where, and every where. I still think that no actions ought to be allowed to be brought in the federal courts, between citizens of different states; at least, unless the cause be of very considerable importance. And that no action against a state government, by any citizen or foreigner, ought to be allowed; and no action, in which a foreign subject is party, at least, unless it be of very considerable importance, ought to be instituted in federal courts. I confess, I can see no reason whatever, for a foreigner, or for citizens of different states, carrying sixpenny causes into the federal courts. I think the state courts will be found by experience, to be bottomed on better principles, and to administer justice better than the federal courts. The difficulties and dangers I have supposed will result from so large a federal city, and federal districts, from the extension of the federal judicial powers, etc. are not, I conceive, merely possible, but probable. I think pernicious political consequences will follow from them, and from the federal city especially, for very obvious reasons, a few of which I will mention.

We must observe that the citizens of a state will be subject to state as well as federal taxes, and the inhabitants of the federal city and districts only to such taxes as congress may lay. We are not to suppose all our people are attached to free government, and the principles of the common law, but that many thousands of them will prefer a city governed not on republican principles.

This city, and the government of it, must indubitably take their tone from the characters of the men, who from the nature of its situation and institution must collect there. This city will not be established for productive labor, for mercantile, or mechanic industry; but for the residence of government, its officers and attendants. If hereafter it should ever become a place of trade and industry, [yet] in the early periods of its existence, when its laws and government must receive their fixed tone, it must be a mere court, with its appendages - the executive, congress, the law courts, gentlemen of fortune and pleasure, with all the officers, attendants, suitors, expectants and dependents on the whole. However brilliant and honorable this collection may be, if we expect it will have any sincere attachments to simple and frugal republicanism, to that liberty and mild government, which is dear to the laborious part of a free people, we must assuredly deceive ourselves. This early collection will draw to it men from all parts of the country, of a like political description. We see them looking towards the place already.

Such a city, or town, containing a hundred square miles, must soon be the great, the visible, and dazzling centre, the mistress of fashions, and the fountain of politics. There may be a free or shackled press in this city, and the streams which may issue from it may over flow the country, and they will be poisonous or pure, as the fountain may be corrupt or not. But not to dwell on a subject that must give pain to the virtuous friends of freedom, I will only add, can a free and enlightened people create a common head so extensive, so prone to corruption and slavery, as this city probably will be, when they have it in their power to form one pure and chaste, frugal and republican?

THE FEDERAL FARMER

Learn more about American History:  Visit Jamestown, Yorktown and Colonial Williamsburg living history museums in Virginia.

Related articles

• Federalist Papers No. 32. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
• Anti Federalist Papers No. 30-31 - A Virginia Anti-Federalist On The Issue Of Taxation
• Anti Federalist Papers No's 41-43 A, Powers of The Constitution
• Anti Federalist Papers No. 24, Objections to A Standing Army (Part 1)
• Anti Federalist Papers No. 25 - Objections To A Standing Army (Part II)
• Federalist Papers No. 30. Concerning the General Power of Taxation

Letter From Thomas Jefferson to James Madison

English: A Portrait of Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

TO JAMES MADISON.

Paris, December 16, 1786.

Dear Sir,—After a very long silence, I am at length able to write to you. An unlucky dislocation of my right wrist, has disabled me from using that hand, three months. I now begin to use it a little, but with great pain; so that this letter must be taken up at such intervals as the state of my hand will permit, and will probably be the work of some days. Though the joint seems to be well set, the swelling does not abate, nor the use of it return. I am now, therefore, on the point of setting out to the south of France, to try the use of some mineral waters there, by immersion. This journey will be of two or three months.

I enclose you herein a copy of the letter from the Minister of Finance to me, making several advantageous regulations for our commerce. The obtaining this has occupied us a twelve month. I say us, because I find the Marquis de La Fayette so useful an auxiliary, that acknowledgments for his co-operation are always due. There remains still something to do for the articles of rice, turpentine, and ship duties. What can be done for tobacco, when the late regulation expires, is very uncertain. The commerce between the United States and this country being put on a good footing, we may afterwards proceed to try if anything can be done, to favor our intercourse with her colonies. Admission into them for our fish and flour, is very desirable; but, unfortunately, both those articles would raise a competition against their own.

I find by the public papers, that your commercial convention failed in point of representation. If it should produce a full meeting in May, and a broader reformation, it will still be well. To make us one nation as to foreign concerns, and keep us distinct in domestic ones, gives the outline of the proper division of powers between the general and particular governments. But, to enable the federal head to exercise the powers given it to best advantage, it should be organized as the particular ones are, into legislative, executive, and judiciary. The first and last are already separated. The second should be. When last with Congress, I often proposed to members to do this, by making of the committee of the States, an executive committee during the recess of Congress, and, during its sessions, to appoint a committee to receive and despatch all executive business, so that Congress itself should meddle only with what should be legislative. But I question if any Congress (much less all successively) can have self-denial enough to go through with this distribution. The distribution, then, should be imposed on them. I find Congress have reversed their division of the western States, and proposed to make them fewer and larger. This is reversing the natural order of things. A tractable people may be governed in large bodies; but, in proportion as they depart from this character, the extent of their government must be less. We see into what small divisions the Indians are obliged to reduce their societies. This measure, with the disposition to shut up the Mississippi, gives me serious apprehensions of the severance of the eastern and western parts of our confederacy. It might have been made the interest of the western States to remain united with us, by managing their interests honestly, and for their own good. But, the moment we sacrifice their interests to our own, they will see it better to govern themselves. The moment they resolve to do this, the point is settled. A forced connection is neither our interest, nor within our power.

The Virginia act for religious freedom has been received with infinite approbation in Europe, and propagated with enthusiasm. I do not mean by the governments, but by the individuals who compose them. It has been translated into French and Italian, has been sent to most of the courts of Europe, and has been the best evidence of the falsehood of those reports which stated us to be in anarchy. It is inserted in the new "Encyclopédie," and is appearing in most of the publications respecting America. In fact, it is comfortable to see the standard of reason at length erected, after so many ages, during which the human mind has been held in vassalage by kings, priests, and nobles; and it is honorable for us, to have produced the first legislature who had the courage to declare, that the reason of man may be trusted with the formation of his own opinions.

*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *

I thank you for your communications in Natural History. The several instances of trees, &c., found far below the surface of the earth, as in the case of Mr. Hay's well, seem to set the reason of man at defiance.

I am, dear Sir, with sincere esteem, your friend and servant.

Related articles

English: The signature of Thomas Jefferson, 3rd President of the United States. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

• What Happens When You Remove Religion From Society?
• Jefferson and Adams on Freedom of Religion

Anti Federalist Papers No's 41-43 A, Powers of The Constitution

Taken from "THE FEDERAL FARMER"

---

. . . . A federal republic in itself supposes state or local governments to exist, as the body or props, on which the federal bead rests, and that it cannot remain a moment after they cease. In erecting the federal government, and always in its councils, each state must be known as a sovereign body. But in erecting this government, I conceive, the legislature of the state, by the expressed or implied assent of the people, or the people of the state, under the direction of the government of it, may accede to the federal compact. Nor do I conceive it to be necessarily a part of a confederacy of states, that each have an equal voice in the general councils. A confederated republic being organized, each state must retain powers for managing its internal police, and all delegate to the union power to manage general concerns. The quantity of power the union must possess is one thing; the mode of exercising the powers given is quite a different consideration - and it is the mode of exercising them, that makes one of the essential distinctions between one entire or consolidated government, and a federal republic. That is, however the government may be organized, if the laws of the union, in most important concerns, as in levying and collecting taxes, raising troops, etc. , operate immediately upon the persons and property of individuals, and not on states, extend to organizing the militia, etc. , the government, as to its administration, as to making and executing laws, is not federal, but consolidated. To illustrate my idea: the union makes a requisition, and assigns to each state its quota of men or monies wanted; each state, by its own laws and officers, in its own way, furnishes its quota. Here the state governments stand between the union and individuals; the laws of the union operate only on states, as such, and federally. Here nothing can be done without the meetings of the state legislatures. But in the other case the union, though the state legislatures should not meet for years together, proceeds immediately by its own laws and officers to levy and collect monies of individuals, to enlist men, form armies, etc. Here the laws of the union operate immediately on the body of the people, on persons and property. In the same manner the laws of one entire consolidated government operate. These two modes are very distinct, and in their operation and consequences have directly opposite tendencies. . . . I am not for depending wholly on requisitions.

Since the peace, and till the convention reported, the wisest men in the United States generally supposed that certain limited funds would answer the purposes of the union. And though the states are by no means in so good a condition as I wish they were, yet, I think, I may very safely affirm, they are in a better condition than they would be had congress always possessed the powers of taxation now contended for. The fact is admitted, that our federal government does not possess sufficient powers to give life and vigor to the political system; and that we experience disappointments, and several inconveniences. But we ought carefully to distinguish those which are merely the consequences of a severe and tedious war, from those which arise from defects in the federal system. There has been an entire revolution in the United States within thirteen years, and the least we can compute the waste of labor and property at, during that period, by the war, is three hundred millions of dollars. Our people are like a man just recovering from a severe fit of sickness. It was the war that disturbed the course of commerce introduced floods of paper money, the stagnation of credit, and threw many valuable men out of steady business. From these sources our greatest evils arise. Men of knowledge and reflection must perceive it. But then, have we not done more in three or four years past, in repairing the injuries of the war, by repairing houses and estates, restoring industry, frugality, the fisheries, manufactures, etc. , and thereby laying the foundation of good government, and of individual and political happiness, than any people ever did in a like time? We must judge from a view of the country and facts, and not from foreign newspapers, or our own, which are printed chiefly in the commercial towns, where imprudent living, imprudent importations, and many unexpected disappointments, have produced a despondency, and a disposition to view everything on the dark side. Some of the evils we feel, all will agree, ought to be imputed to the defective administration of the governments.

From these and various considerations, I am very clearly of opinion that the evils we sustain merely on account of the defects of the confederation, ar but as a feather in the balance against a mountain, compared with those which would infallibly be the result of the loss of general liberty, and that happiness men enjoy under a frugal, free, and mild government.

Heretofore we do not seem to have seen danger any where, but in giving power to congress, and now no where but in congress wanting powers; and without examining the extent of the evils to be remedied, by one step we ar for giving up to congress almost all powers of any importance without limitation. The defects of the confederation are extravagantly magnified, an every species of pain we feel imputed to them; and hence it is inferred, the must be a total change of the principles, as well as forms of government And in the main point, touching the federal powers, we rest all on a logical inference, totally inconsistent with experience and sound political reasoning.

It is said, that as the federal head must make peace and war, and provide for the common defense, it ought to possess all powers necessary to that end. That powers unlimited, as to the purse and sword, to raise men and monies and form the militia, are necessary to that end; and therefore, the federal head ought to possess them. This reasoning is far more specious than solid. It is necessary that these powers so exist in the body politic, as to be called into exercise whenever necessary for the public safety. But it is by no means true that the man, or congress of men, whose duty it more immediately is to provide for the common defense, ought to possess them without limitation. But clear it is, that if such men, or congress, be not in a situation to hold them without danger to liberty, he or they ought not to possess them. It has long been thought to be a well founded position, that the purse and sword ought not to be placed in the same hands in a free government. Our wise ancestors have carefully separated them - placed the sword in the hands of their king, even under considerable limitations, and the purse in the hands of the commons alone. Yet the king makes peace and war, and it is his duty to provide for the common defense of the nation. This authority at least goeth thus far - that a nation, well versed in the science of government, does not conceive it to be necessary or expedient for the man entrusted with the common defense and general tranquility, to possess unlimitedly the power in question, or even in any considerable degree. Could he, whose duty it is t defend the public, possess in himself independently, all the means of doing it consistent with the public good, it might be convenient. But the people o England know that their liberties and happiness would be in infinitely great danger from the king's unlimited possession of these powers, than from al external enemies and internal commotions to which they might be exposed Therefore, though they have made it his duty to guard the empire, yet the have wisely placed in other hands, the hands of their representatives, the power to deal out and control the means. In Holland their high mightiness must provide for the common defense, but for the means they depend in considerable degree upon requisitions made on the state or local assemblies Reason and facts evince, that however convenient it might be for an executive magistrate, or federal head, more immediately charged with the national defense and safety, solely, directly, and independently to possess all the means, yet such magistrate or head never ought to possess them if thereby the public liberties shall be endangered. The powers in question never have been, by nations wise and free, deposited, nor can they ever be, with safety, any where out of the principal members of the national system. Where these form one entire government, as in Great Britain, they are separated and lodged in the principal members of it. But in a federal republic, there is quite a different organization; the people form this kind of government, generally, because their territories are too extensive to admit of their assembling in one legislature, or of executing the laws on free principles under one entire government. They Convene in their local assemblies, for local purposes, and for managing their internal concerns, and unite their states under a federal head for general purposes. It is the essential characteristic of a confederated republic, that this head be dependent on, and kept within limited bounds by the local governments; and it is because, in these alone, in fact, the people can be substantially assembled or represented. It is, therefore, we very universally see, in this kind of government, the congressional powers placed in a few hands, and accordingly limited, and specifically enumerated; and the local assemblies strong and well guarded, and composed of numerous members. Wise men will always place the controlling power where the people are substantially collected by their representatives. By the proposed system the federal head will possess, without limitation, almost every species of power that can, in its exercise, tend to change the government, or to endanger liberty; while in it, I think it has been fully shown, the people will have but the shadow of representation, and but the shadow of security for their rights and liberties. In a confederated republic, the division of representation, etc. , in its nature, requires a correspondent division and deposit of powers, relative to taxes and military concerns. And I think the plan offered stands quite alone, in confounding the principles of governments in themselves totally distinct. I wish not to exculpate the states for their improper neglects in not paying their quotas of requisitions. But, in applying the remedy, we must be governed by reason and facts. It will not be denied that the people have a right to change the government when the majority choose it, if not restrained by some existing compact; that they have a right to displace their rulers, and consequently to determine when their measures are reasonable or not; and that they have a right, at any time, to put a stop to those measures they may deem prejudicial to them, by such forms and negatives as they may see fit to provide. From all these, and many other well founded considerations, I need not mention, a question arises, what powers shall there be delegated to the federal head, to insure safety, as well as energy, in the government? I think there is a safe and proper medium pointed out by experience, by reason, and facts. When we have organized the government, we ought to give power to the union, so far only as experience and present circumstances shall direct, with a reasonable regard to time to come.

Should future circumstances, contrary to our expectations, require that further powers be transferred to the union, we can do it far more easily, than get back those we may now imprudently give. The system proposed is untried. Candid advocates and opposers admit, that it is in a degree, a mere experiment, and that its organization is weak and imperfect. Surely then, the safe ground is cautiously to vest power in it, and when we are sure we have given enough for ordinary exigencies, to be extremely careful how we delegate powers, which, in common cases, must necessarily be useless or abused, and of very uncertain effect in uncommon ones. By giving the union power to regulate commerce, and to levy and collect taxes by imposts, we give it an extensive authority, and permanent productive funds, I believe quite as adequate to present demands of the union, as excises and direct taxes can be made to the present demands of the separate states. The state governments are now about four times as expensive as that of the union; and their several state debts added together, are nearly as large as that of the union. Our impost duties since the peace have been almost as productive as the other sources of taxation, and when under one general system of regulations, the probability is that those duties will be very considerably increased. Indeed the representation proposed will hardly justify giving to congress unlimited powers to raise taxes by imposts, in addition to the other powers the union must necessarily have. It is said, that if congress possess only authority to raise taxes by imposts, trade probably will be overburdened with taxes, and the taxes of the union be found inadequate to any uncommon exigencies. To this we may observe, that trade generally finds its own level, and will naturally and necessarily heave off any undue burdens laid upon it. Further, if congress alone possess the impost, and also unlimited power to raise monies by excises and direct taxes, there must be much more danger that two taxing powers, the union and states, will carry excises and direct taxes to an unreasonable extent, especially as these have not the natural boundaries taxes on trade have. However, it is not my object to propose to exclude congress from raising monies by internal taxes, except in strict conformity to the federal plan; that is, by the agency of the state governments in all cases, except where a state shall neglect, for an unreasonable time, to pay its quota of a requisition; and never where so many of the state legislatures as represent a majority of the people, shall formally determine an excise law or requisition is improper, in their next session after the same be laid before them. We ought always to recollect that the evil to be guarded against is found by our own experience, and the experience of others, to be mere neglect in the states to pay their quotas; and power in the union to levy and collect the neglecting states' quotas with interest, is fully adequate to the evil. By this federal plan, with this exception mentioned, we secure the means of collecting the taxes by the usual process of law, and avoid the evil of attempting to compel or coerce a state; and we avoid also a circumstance, which never yet could be, and I am fully confident never can be, admitted in a free federal republic - I mean a permanent and continued system of tax laws of the union, executed in the bowels of the states by many thousand officers, dependent as to the assessing and collecting federal taxes solely upon the union. On every principle, then, we ought to provide that the union render an exact account of all monies raised by imposts and other taxes whenever monies shall be wanted for the purposes of the union beyond the proceeds of the impost duties; requisitions shall be made on the states for the monies so wanted; and that the power of laying and collecting shall never be exercised, except in cases where a state shall neglect, a given time, to pay its quota. This mode seems to be strongly pointed out by the reason of the case, and spirit of the government; and I believe, there is no instance to be found in a federal republic, where the congressional powers ever extended generally to collecting monies by direct taxes or excises. Creating all these restrictions, still the powers of the union in matters of taxation will be too unlimited; further checks, in my mind, are indispensably necessary. Nor do I conceive, that as full a representation as is practicable in the federal government, will afford sufficient security. The strength of the government, and the confidence of the people, must be collected principally in the local assemblies. . . . A government possessed of more power than its constituent parts will justify, will not only probably abuse it, but be unequal to bear its own burden; it may as soon be destroyed by the pressure of power, as languish and perish for want of it.

There are two ways further of raising checks, and guarding against undue combinations and influence in a federal system. The first is - in levying taxes, raising and keeping up armies, in building navies, in forming plans for the militia, and in appropriating monies for the support of the military - to require the attendance of a large proportion of the federal representatives, as two-thirds or three-fourths of them; and in passing laws, in these important cases, to require the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the members present. The second is, by requiring that certain important laws of the federal head - as a requisition or a law for raising monies by excise - shall be laid before the state legislatures, and if disapproved of by a given number of them, say by as many of them as represent a majority of the people, the law shall have no effect. Whether it would be advisable to adopt both, or either of these checks, I will not undertake to determine. We have seen them both exist in confederated republics. The first exists substantially in the confederation, and will exist in some measure in the plan proposed, as in choosing a president by the house, or in expelling members; in the senate, in making treaties, and in deciding on impeachments; and in the whole, in altering the constitution. The last exists in the United Netherlands, but in a much greater extent. The first is founded on this principle, that these important measures may, sometimes, be adopted by a bare quorum of members, perhaps from a few states, and that a bare majority of the federal representatives may frequently be of the aristocracy, or some particular interests, connections, or parties in the community, and governed by motives, views, and inclinations not compatible with the general interest. The last is founded on this principle, that the people will be substantially represented, only in their state or local assemblies; that their principal security must be found in them; and that, therefore, they ought to have ultimately a constitutional control over such interesting measures.

THE FEDERAL FARMER

Learn More About United States History:  Visit Jamestown, Yorktown and Colonial Williamsburg Living Museums in Virginia.

Related articles

• Anti Federalist Papers No. 21 Why The Articles Failed
• Federalist Papers No. 41. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
• Anti Federalist Paper No. 16 - EUROPEANS ADMIRE AND FEDERALISTS DECRY THE PRESENT SYSTEM
• The Federalist Papers No 14, Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answer
• Anti federalist Papers No. 22 Articles of Confederation Simply Requires Amendments, Particularly For Commercial Power and Judicial Power; Constitution Goes Too Far
• The Anti Federalist Papers No. 17 Federalist Power Will Ultimately Subvert State Authority

Undermining The Constitution A HISTORY OF LAWLESS GOVERNMENT Part V

The United States Supreme Court. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

By Thomas James Norton

FOLLOWING THE INCOME-TAX AMENDMENT IN 1918, THE NEXT VIOLENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE WAS UNDERTAKEN IN 1916 BY A SOCIALIST-MINDED GROUP SEEKING TO BREAK DOWN THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND HAVE WASHINGTON ASSUME POLICE POWER IN THE STATES OVER PERSONS UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS

As late as 1916, when the attempt at undermining the States by transgressing the Tenth Amendment was undertaken by a very formidable and persistent aggregation of forces, the assailants were three times hurled back in a battle which lasted twelve years. But the contest was close.

The Judiciary in defense of the Constitution

Congress passed two unconstitutional bills and the President, presumably advised by the Attorney General, signed them. Constitutional government, and the Tenth Amendment particularly, were saved by the Supreme Court.

Under the direction of the American translator of the writings of the patriarchs of Communism, Karl Marx and

83

---

84

Friedrich Engels, there was begun in 1916 an extraordinary attempt to break down the constitutional structure of the United States and thereby curtail the liberties of the American.
This woman pushed a bill through Congress which would forbid the moving in interstate commerce of manufactured articles into the making of which the work of persons under the age of 18 years had entered. The ostensible idea was to protect the young from oppression by ruthless employers and uncivilized fathers and mothers who were taking wages from the servitude of their children. From the strident propaganda that was organized and turned loose, a stranger just arriving on the planet would conclude that parenthood on the Earth was covetous wickedness itself.
Strategy of Communism in 1916
According to the "Woman Patriot," a paper then published in the City of Washington, the promoter of the Child Labor Law had boasted that in her legislative drives she never let appear on the front of the movement the real intent of the propagandists. That is the basic strategy of Communism. The Child Labor Act had no relation to child labor, because there was in objectionable volume no such thing. After the census of 1920 the Department of Labor made a boastful report to the effect that since the taking of the last decennial census so many laws of States had lengthened the months of school required; had set such severe conditions for a youth to qualify for work during vacation, had so completely forbidden work by minors in theatres and like places and prohibited working with

---

85

dangerous machinery, that the so-called child-labor evil had been all but wiped out.
But even had the States been delinquent in the exercise of their police power to guard the health, education and welfare of childhood, that could not have conferred power on Congress to assume jurisdiction. It had no place in the field of the States. It has been shown from authorities that the States cannot abdicate their police powers and that Congress cannot take them over.
Had there been a child-labor evil -- and there was none of magnitude -- it was for the people at home to make their legislatures take police action.
But, as before said, the "ballyhoo" was so overwhelming and ceaseless that many good but uninformed people were taken off their feet, and they gave way to tears for the American child so victimized by his greedy and heartless parents.
No child-labor problem in 1916
There being no child-labor problem to solve, it is manifest that the undertaking was to remove the youth of the land away from the police control of the States -- as the National Labor Relations Act, 19 years later, removed all workers -- children and adults -- of the country out of local jurisdiction -- and transfer authority over them to the central Government at Washington. Making the central Government top-heavy would cause it in time to collapse of its own weight, and the collapse of the finest specimen of Government securing liberty and property has been the object of Communism for many years.

---

86

Governor Roosevelt denounced misuse of Commerce Clause
The use of the Commerce Clanse of the Constitution to bolster the act of Congress was one of those lawlessnesses which Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York denounced in the strongest terms. And when he became President he broke all records in promoting this sort of legislative malpractice!
Why did men representing the people of the States in Congress vote for a bill by which the Nation would usurp power not granted to it by the Constitution, and the States would lose by abandonment powers inherent in them for the care and protection of youth?
Why did a President with an Attorney General to advise him sign such a bill? What is an Attorney General for?
Congress could not by its act gather to itself police power over "the health, morals, safety, education and general well-being of the people." Nor could the States surrender their local police sovereignty to Washington. That was decided (219 U. S. 270) in 1911 by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Of course, when an employer and a father both attacked the act as against liberty, the Supreme Court in 1918 held (247 V. S. 251) that, although it pretended to be a regulation of commerce between the States, it was in reality a seizure from the States of their police power, in violation of the Tenth Amendment, and therefore unconstitutional.
Did that stop the constitutional illiterates representing the States in the Congress in their push to degrade their commonwealths?
No.

---

87

Congress shifted from Commerce Clause to Taxing Clause
In 1919 Congress passed a Child Labor Tax Act and the President signed it, presumably with the approval of the Attorney General By that enactment a destructive tax was placed on the product of child labor, so heavy that the manufacturer could not sell the goods in competition with other makers. The Commerce Clause having failed to support the other act, Congress resorted to the Taxing Clause.
But when a citizen affected by the legislation attacked it, the Supreme Court in 1922 held (259 U. S. 20) that as the tax imposed was intended to prevent the manufacture by youth, it would also put an end thereby to the revenue, for which reason it could not be treated as a revenue act. It was palpably another lawless attempt by Congress to take from under the police power of the States the supervision and protection of youth.^[1]
Neither did that decision stop the constitutional illiterates of the States in Congress in their determination -- or in the determination of the Communist-minded and unschooled sentimentalists who were lashing them -- to weaken their commonwealths and enlarge the central Government.
The energy and fury behind this movement of Communism, supported by weeping women and educators, was frightening.
1. This decision by Chief Justice Taft, that a pretended tax law which is not for revenue is unconstitutional and fraudulent, disposes of the preposterous proposition of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress, namely, that taxes be made so heavy as to permit no income above $25,000 a year, and that all incomes be prevented from being "too high."
It also disposes of several poorly considered dicta of "progressive" judges, that taxes may be levied for regulatory and punitive purposes.

---

88

Members of Congress make third effort to degrade their States
Having failed twice in "dashing itself against the imprisoning walls of the Constitution," as Bryce described our legislative body, Congress proposed in 1924 an amendment to the Fundamental Law which would empower it to prohibit labor throughout the United States of persons under the age of 18 years.
It was immediately rejected by enough legislative bodies in the States to defeat it, but every time new legislatures were elected the promoters again urged adoption.
During the pendency of the proposal before the legislatures of the States, 20 of them repeatedly rejected it, in Massachusetts 8 times, in New York 7 times, in Texas and South Dakota 6 times, and in 3 other States 5 times.
In 23 instances attempts were made in Congress to modify the resolution so as to draw in some of its reckless implications, but they were voted down -- sometimes howled down without a record vote.
When President Roosevelt took office he immediately urged legislatures to adopt it, which course was an illegal interference by the Executive with the functions of the States. It was also contrary to his declarations as Governor of New York. Some States acted as he requested; but when he telegraphed "my native State" to ratify the proposal, the legislature of New York promptly rejected it.
The rejection of the proposal by the legislatures shows that many Congressmen were as badly informed of the wishes of their constituents as they were on the Constitution.

---

89

Peril from uneducated public opinion
What insidious and unseen power could maintain for more than a dozen years that assault on the constitutional integrity of the United States? Why was there not force enough in public opinion to check Congress in its wayward course?
It may be that the defeat which Congress suffered in 1918 in the first decision of the Supreme Court respecting Child Labor was the cause of its classing in the Revenue Act of 1919 the compensation of the judges as income subject to taxation and thereby reducing their compensation, which the Constitution forbids.
The way to cure the weakness is by requiring the schools, colleges, and universities to make everyone graduating a sound constitutional scholar.
About forty of our States have laws requiring the teaching of the Constitution of the United States in public and private schools, but in not one State is our Great Charter thoroughly taught as a separate study to the youth who are to govern the land and hold the destinies of the Republic.
Could you believe this?
To show that references herein to constitutional illiteracy are not extravagant or unjust, it is mentioned that in March, 1947, a dispatch from Washington said that a member of the House of Representatives from the great State of Illinois and a member from the great State of Louisiana introduced bills making it a felony to try to bribe an athlete. There had recently been much in print

---

90

about crookedness in baseball and other sports. The boy or girl leaving school before reaching High, as over 16 per cent of them do (while half of the 1,700,000 leave before the end of the second year), to govern the United States and direct its destiny, should know better than that. It is an indictment of schools, colleges, and universities that members of Congress should introduce such bills. Felonies fall within the police power of the States.
The man power of Congress has undergone change
Congress has no Sumner, no Conkling, no Cameron, no Hoar, no Ingalls, no duplicates of the many old worthies -- chosen for the Senate by legislatures instead of popular vote -- with experience in taking the President by the sleeve and showing him back to his place.
When the States take back their Union they should tolerate no more weak Congresses. It is discreditable to them as governmental entities and to their people entrusted with the present and the future of the Republic that there should have been Congresses deserving of the epithet of "rubber stamp."
General and thorough constitutional education only hope
They should require that every man and woman appearing to register as a voter present a card showing membership in One Great Union, a certificate from the County Superintendent of Schools that the bearer has passed a thorough examination in writing on both the History and the Constitution of the United States. The requirement of an examination in writing would disqualify, properly, the

---

91

illiterates who control the great cities which drag down the States. The predicament of the State with an unclean city is likened in the memoirs of Senator Hoar of Massachusetts to the eagle in Tennyson, "caught by his talons in carrion and unable to rise and soar."
It would also repair the damage done by the delinquent States which frustrated the Australian ballot^[2] and gave to the political bosses in the cities for the use of their illiterates the "straight ticket" -- and too often the control of the Presidential election.
The rescue of the Union by the States and the preservation of it perpetually is that easy.
Spinsters worry about Maternity and Infancy
While the proponents of the Child Labor Acts and the proposed Child Labor Amendment drove their measures through Congress, like-minded groups "put over" in 1921 An Act for the Promotion of the Welfare and Hygiene of Maternity and Infancy, and for Other Purposes.
In a strong argument against the power of Congress to pass such a bill under the Constitution, Senator Reed of Missouri read the catalogue of the names of the women
2. The Australian ballot groups the names of all the candidates for one office in one block, all the names of candidates for another office in another block, and so on. There can be no "straight ticket." If the voter is too illiterate to find the names of those for whom he would vote, that is to the advantage of the country.
Penalties are visited upon the citizens who do not vote unless they present valid excuses. The Australian Embassy said that in 1943 the vote in the Federal election was 96.3 per cent of the electors. All the States in Australia have compulsory voting laws.
In our election in 1948 only 47,500,000 persons voted, although, according to the Bureau of the Census, there were 95,000,000 eligible to vote.
Ohio adopted in 1949 a form of ballot to put an end to the "straight ticket." That looks like sunrise.

---

92

throughout the land leading the move toward centralism -- and not one of them was married!
The law expired by limitation in 1929 after costing the taxpayers $11,000,000. The American Medical Association reported that not one new idea was developed by the expensive experiment. It is the only legislation of the socialistic sort from which Congress eventually backed away. A constitutional amendment may some day wipe out the others.
Had the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of two cases brought to test the validity of this Maternity Act, instead of questioning the right of the plaintiffs (262 U. S. 447), and had it shown for permanency, after the manner of John Marshall, the line between the power of the Nation and that of the States respecting such subjects, then A Bill to Alleviate the Hazards of Old Age, Unemployment, Illness, and Dependency, to Establish a Social Insurance Board in the Department of Labor, to Raise Revenue, and for Other Purposes, along with other kindred measures of the "New Deal," might never have been attempted.
A Judiciary without statesmanship to foresee the consequences to the Republic of a decision is not what the writers of the Constitution designed.
Where the States might have been constructively busy
While the representatives of the States in Congress were passing unconstitutional bills to deprive their commonwealths of police power over youth, maternity, and infancy, and proposing an amendment which the legislatures of the States rejected, many times by some of the States, the members of the legislatures were, seemingly, so occu-

---

93

pied at home with building debt that they, also, were at fault regarding the constitutional position and the obligations of their States.
A notable illustration of this is in their failure to take hold of the matter of divorce, a subject of police which our "centralists" have for a long time been asking Washington to regulate. It has been before the public for a quarter of a century or more, and in January, 1950, it was discussed in a meeting of workers for improved social conditions. The Committee on Uniform State Laws of the American Bar Association, which framed bills on many subjects acceptable to all the legislatures for enactment, gave this problem up.
Of course, it is a subject for the States. Massachusetts long ago settled the question for itself, and all the other States need to do is to copy the statute of Massachusetts, which was upheld (188 U. S. 14) by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1903.
How Massachusetts laid down the law
The General Court (legislature) of Massachusetts declared that a decree of divorce granted to a citizen of that State by a court of another State would be valid in Massachusetts when the foreign court should have had jurisdiction of both parties; but that when an inhabitant of Massachusetts should go to another jurisdiction for a divorce for a cause arising in Massachusetts when both parties are domiciled there, or for a cause which would not authorize a divorce in Massachusetts, a decree in such a case would have no effect in that commonwealth.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that law not repugnant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of

---

94

the Constitution, requiring the judicial proceedings and public acts of one State to be given effect in all others. Massachusetts was not obliged to give credit to a decree to one of its citizens when obtained against its public policy.
Wherein the decree was void
An inhabitant of Massachusetts went to South Dakota and obtained a decree of divorce in a suit in which his wife did not appear. Because the court had no jurisdiction of her the decree was of no force against her in Massachusetts. The husband returned to Massachusetts and remarried. Upon his death his first wife brought proceedings to be adjudged his widowed spouse and to be entitled to administer his estate and take his property. She won.
A similar statute of North Carolina, requiring a spouse domiciled in that State and desiring a decree of divorce, to apply to a court of North Carolina, was upheld by the Supreme Court (325 U. S. 226) in 1945, respecting decrees granted in Nevada when the applicants were not in law domiciled there. The domicile is the place where a person resides and intends to stay. Marrying in Nevada immediately after receiving decrees, the two spouses returned to North Carolina, They were arrested on the charge of bigamous cohabitation, the former spouse of each being resident in the State.
Plain cure tor laxity in divorces
So it would be a very simple undertaking for the legislatures of the States to copy the law of Massachusetts or that of North Carolina, both held constitutional.
That would bring down to earth the whole flock of

---

95

those "birds of passage," as one court described them, who are pictured day by day at the airports taking flight for Nevada, Florida, or Mexico to get quick releases from the first, second, third, or fourth bondage.

Neglect of this subject has been one of the most censurable delinquencies of the States.

http://www.barefootsworld.net/    Thanks to the wonderful folks over at Barefoot's World.

Related articles

• Undermining The Constitution A HISTORY OF LAWLESS GOVERNMENT (Part 3)
• Undermining The Constitution A HISTORY OF LAWLESS GOVERNMENT (Part 1)
• FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 40. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained.
• Anti Federalist Papers No. 39 - Appearance And Reality - The Form Is Federal; The Effect Is National
• Why did the Attorney General change the Commonwealth's legal position in Bostic v. Rainey?
• Federalist Papers No. 39. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles